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ARTICLE
SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN
CORPORATE DECISIONMAKING
UNDER GERMAN LAW:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Bernd Singhof
Oliver Seiler*
INTRODUCTION
Corporate Governance issues are on the national agenda
in Germany for two reasons: economic struggle on one hand,
and promotion of equity investment and robust capital markets
on the other. The first reason is quite obvious: Writing in the
depths of a bad economic situation, commentators bemoan the
competitive failures of German corporations and the depress-
ingly large number of unemployed people. While German stock
markets are booming and generating high profits, the increase
in shareholder value does not correlate with other benefits for
the economy, such as high employment rates. The market
members fail to push the development into the right direction.
Quite naturally, under those circumstances, the debate among
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commentators focusses on whether German mechanisms for
monitoring and controlling corporate managers are inferior to
those of the United States. The second main impact on the
current German debate on corporate governance issues flows
from concern over the promotion and competitiveness of Ger-
man capital markets. These markets are undergoing a fast and
breathtaking change regarding their legal framework, their
depth, and the creation of new market segments. Meanwhile,
the third Financial Market Promotion Act (Finanzmarkt-
fVrderungsgesetz) has passed the legislative process, and the
fourth act of this kind seems to be on the way. Although corpo-
rate law and capital markets law in Germany traditionally
have never been regarded as intimately related as they are in
the United States, there is an increasing awareness of their
interactive influence. Scholars and practitioners are equally
sensitized to the globalization of securities markets. They are
worried that certain features of German corporate law may
deter foreign (institutional) investors from seeking offshore
investment in Germany (for example, banks' influence on proxy
voting and the lack of derivative shareholder litigation).
While the degree of influence a certain corporate gover-
nance system may exert on a firm's performance is somewhat
imponderable, it is for these reasons that there is great temp-
tation to transplant legal rules from one system to another.
Some years ago, when American corporations were struggling,
exactly the same debate was sparked from an American per-
spective, and the debate has not yet been extinguished. Critics
suggested that commercial bank involvement in corporate
governance is desirable, because it fosters a type of "relational
investing" that is supposed to lead to effective monitoring by
sophisticated intermediaries. These critics wished that Ameri-
can institutional investors would exercise their corporate influ-
ence with the vigor of German banks. Unlike their American
counterparts, the latter have never been legally barred from
taking an active role in corporate decisionmaking.
Today, some German scholars cast doubt on the desirabili-
ty of this feature of German corporate governance. In particu-
lar, they argue that banks' influence among others (such as
cross holdings among corporations) is one of the main reasons
for inflexibility in German corporate governance. At the same
time, the critics yearn for more active and interested, yet dis-
persed shareholders. Also, there have been doubts about the
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quality of the performance of the supervisory board
(Aufsichtsrat) which is supposed to control and supervise man-
agement and, in particular circumstances, to file a lawsuit
against management. Thus, it is now recognized that share-
holders may need a more powerful weapon to threaten man-
agement immediately after some kind of failure. The experi-
ence in the United States with derivative litigation, however,
suggests that the results often are not promising. In the Unit-
ed States, which has been called, "the most lawsuit-crazy coun-
try in the world"' a group of plaintiffs lawyers frequently has
taken advantage of some legal loopholes, by filing suits that
have no merits save one: attorneys' fees.
Scholars in both countries who are looking for "offshore
improvement" to their present national corporate governance
system may realize that adaption of legal structures in most
cases might be difficult, or even impossible, since they are a
reflection of complex cultural, social and economic forces
unique to a particular country.2 Nevertheless, as the great
impact of American law on German and European Capital
Markets Law, and the cautious but significant liberalization of
the scope and geographical range of bank activities in the
United States show, scholars both in Germany and the United
States may recognize the array of foreign corporate alterna-
tives and think about how to shape (or amend) them to fit in
their national system.3
Much of the confusion in the debate and evaluation of the
foreign system stems from lack of legal and factual informa-
tion, simplifications, and a related failure to appreciate the
complex legal and economic forces in the particular country. In
this article, we want to shed light on two selected and interre-
lated aspects of shareholder participation in corporate
decisionmaking under German law.
1. David S. Jackson, Litigation Valley, TIM, Nov. 4, 1996, at 72. For a criti-
cal voice as to the "derivative dilemma," see Carol B. Swanson, Corporate Gover-
nance: Sliding Seamlessly into the Twenty-First Century, 21 J. CORP. L. 417, 437
(1996) (cautioning that the "corporation, not court, should resolve internal business
conflicts") [hereinafter Swanson, Corporate Governance].
2. James A. Fanto, The Transformation of French Corporate Governance and
United States Institutional Investors, 21 BROOK. J. INTL L. 1, 4 (1995) [hereinafter
Fanto, Transformation]; Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons
from Comparative Corporate Law, 102 YALE L.J. 2021, 2021 (1993).
3. See Fanto, Transformation, supra note 2, at 4.
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As Berle and Means described more than half a century
ago,4 large publicly-held entities, which are most commonly
thought of as the prototype of the modern corporation, share
one striking feature-the separation of stock ownership and
control. Shareholders collectively own the corporation but do
not, as a general rule, manage it. Despite some remarkable
differences, especially as the degree of shareholder dispersion
is concerned, this is the case in both the United States and
Germany. The separation of ownership from control creates a
fundamental tension between shareholders and management.
In order to bridge this tension, each system of corporate gover-
nance demands mechanisms that ensure accountability. Expe-
rience demonstrates that, although managers hold their power
in trust, they do not always carry out the business according to
their fiduciary obligations because of their inherent self-inter-
est. Corporate law both in Germany and the United States,
although significantly different from each other, provides inter
alia two devices which enforce the fiduciary duties imposed
upon the managing group:' First, shareholders can protect
their interests by initiating or participating in permanent
decisionmaking on fundamental corporate matters. This idea
suggests that monitoring should be relegated to those who
provide equity capital to the corporation. However, since there
is just one shareholder meeting per year, shareholders may be
manipulated, disinterested, or face "collective action prob-
lems,"6 therefore, their monitoring function is quite sporadic
and random at best. Second, there is almost always some kind
of legal device by which shareholders or corporate organs rep-
resenting shareholders may "pull the emergency break," if
management is slack and makes disastrous decisions on behalf
of the corporation: Shareholders or their representatives may
4. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY xix (4th ed. 1968).
5. The inherent conflict of interest between management and shareholders is
often referred to as an "agency problem." German and American lawyers view this
issue from different perspectives. While German lawyers emphasize the interest of
the corporation as an entity, American lawyers make clear that shareholders, as
owners and principals, must establish control devices at certain costs to ensure
managements self-interest while not reducing the outcome of the investment. See
Michael C. Jenson & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 FIN. ECON. 305, 308-10 (1976).
6. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAw 67 (1991).
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commence legal proceedings to hold management accountable.
Thus, we focus on "structural rules" 7 that govern the allo-
cation of decisionmaking power between the corporate organ
"management board" (Vorstand) and those people who provide
equity capital to the corporation-the shareholders.' The arti-
cle is subdivided into two similarly structured main parts,
corresponding to the above-mentioned topics. Understandably,
the emphasis in both those parts is on the situation under
German law. As such, the article concentrates on companies
that are subject to the Stock Corporation Act of 1965
(Aktiengesetz).9 Since only shares issued by these corporations
(Aktiengesellschaften) can be quoted on a stock exchange
(B6rsengesetz),'° the Aktiengesellschaften are regarded as the
equivalent to the American publicly-held corporation." Short
summaries of the American legal situation preceding the dis-
cussion of German law do not claim sufficiency, but may serve
as a common basis for the legal analysis and comparison.
7. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1461, 1462 (1989).
8. Id.
9. See Aktiengesetz (AktG) [Stock Corporation Law], v. 06.09.1965 (BGBl. I
S.1089). See also HANNES SCHNEIDER & MARTIN HEIDENHAIN, THE GERMAN STOCK
CORPORATION ACT 94 (1996) (translating the Stock Corporation Act of 1965 into
English).
10. See Bdrsengesetz [Stock Exchange Act], v. 27.05.1908 (RGBI. I S.215) § 36.
11. It is noteworthy that, although the legal framework of Aktiengesellschaften
is designed for large publicly-held corporations, in the majority of AG's the shares
are in the hands of a relatively small group of investors. See Heribert Hirte, The
European Private Company, A German Perspective, in THE -EUROPEAN PRIVATE
COMPANY? 95, 95-96 (Harm-Jan De Kluiver & Walter Van Gerven eds., 1995)
(estimating that in 1993 only approximately thirty AGs were public in the sense
that they were not controlled by a majority shareholder or shareholder group);
John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corpo-
rate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1302 (1991). One should also keep in mind
that the vast majority of companies in Germany are organized in the form of pri-
vate limited liability companies or Gesellschaft mit beschrdnkter Haftung (GmbH).
In 1991 there were about 465,650 GmbHs as opposed to 3,500 AGs, of which only
about 650 were listed on the stock exchange by 1995. See Hirte, supra at 96;
Dieter Feddersen et al., Corporate Governance-eine Einfahrung, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: OPTIMIERUNG DER UNTERNEHMENSFflHRUNG UND DER UNTERNEHMENS-
KONTROLLE IM DEUTSCHEN UND AMERIKANISCHEN AKTIENRECHT 2 (Dieter Feddersen
et al. eds., 1996).
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PART I. SHAREHOLDER VOTING IN PUBLICLY-HELD
CORPORATIONS UNDER U.S. AND GERMAN LAW
No matter which country we focus on, the mechanism by
which stockholders can actively participate in a publicly-held
corporation's decisionmaking process is said to be one of the
most important elements of corporate governance.12 Regard-
less of minor distinctions in different systems of corporate gov-
ernance, shareholder decision making is required in three
areas of corporate affairs: the election of directors, major
changes in the corporate contract (charter amendments), and
major changes in the corporate structure (such as a merger,
sale of substantially all assets, or liquidation).13 Notably, the
voting right attached to a share is meant to mitigate the typi-
cal hazards that flow from the separation of ownership and
control. Given the fact that, in Germany, shares with voting
rights usually receive a higher value than those without, a
shareholder's suffrage is not only a residual device of control,
but also an asset of economic value. 4 However, it is equally
true that, regardless of national differences in the legal frame-
work for shareholder voting, only a few shareholders seem to
have some incentive to exercise their right to vote on funda-
mental corporate matters, or to elect officers and directors.
This may be caused either by a lack of money, time, or inter-
est. Instead, they subscribe to the "Wall Street Rule," in other
words, they "vote with their feet" and get rid of a bad invest-
ment. 5 When evaluating this "investment attitude" we should
12. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381 (1970) (noting
that "[flair corporate suffrage is an important right that should attach to every
equity security bought on a public exchange").
13. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV.
520, 534 (1990) [hereinafter Black, Shareholder Passivity].
14. Previously, even the New York Stock Exchange did not list shares of a
corporation which also had an issue of non-voting stock. See Henry G. Manne,
Some Theoretical Aspects Of Share Voting, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1427, 1429 (1964).
Today, the Exchange's voting rights policy permits the listing of voting common
stock of a corporation which also has outstanding non-voting stock, as well as the
listing of non-voting stock, but has established restrictive "safeguard regulations."
See, e.g., New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual, in CORPORATIONS
AND BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 704, § 313.00(B) (Melvin A. Eisenberg ed., 1996).
15. It is noteworthy, however, that even though dissatisfied shareholders sell
their shares and thereby exit the company, they disseminate important signals to
securities markets participants, thus increasing management accountability. The
greater the liquidity of securities markets, the better the repercussions of the
marketplace may serve as a corporate governance device, supplementing internal
498 [Vol. XXIV:2
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not go to extremes. Nor should we blame the shareholders for
their inertia, 6 which for some practical reasons may be desir-
able. Nor should we underestimate the importance of share-
holder control in corporate governance systems worldwide.
Since management of a large corporation tends to pursue its
own interests, shareholder participation in corporate decision
making remains, in addition to other devices, an essential
constituent of monitoring officers and directors. Therefore,
under corporate law not only must shareholders be able to
authorize other persons to vote shares on their behalf (proxy
voting) but also a form of workable shareholder activity must
be encouraged. Although the theoretical concept of proxy voting
with its classical agency background is quite similar across
nations, cultural, economic and legal circumstances have
shaped some characteristic variations. As will be discussed in
this paper, the proxy systems in the United States and in
Germany show remarkable distinctions, but also do not seem
to be too far away from each other.
A. Proxy Voting Under U.S. Law
Since a full discussion of the details and developments of
voting by proxy under U.S. law is beyond the scope of this
paper, only some basic features need to be set out to create a
basis for the following evaluation. 7
monitoring structures in a corporation. See Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Had-
dock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of the National Market System, 1985 U.
ILL. L. REv. 315, 326 (1985); Norman S. Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A
Critical Look at the SEC's National Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 883, 886
(1981) (defining liquidity as "a market characteristic that enables investors to
dispose of or purchase securities at a price reasonably related to the preceding
price").
16. Some authors call it "rational apathy." See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, COR-
PoRATE LAw 390-92 (1986). See also Harm Peter Westermann, Vollmachtstimmrecht
und Streubesitzaktiondre in der Hauptversammlung deutscher Aktiengesellschaften,
in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: OPTIMIERUNG DER UNTERNEHMENSFOHRUNG UND DER
UNTERNEHMENSKONTROLLE IM DEUTSCHEN UND AMERIKANISCHEN AKTIENRECHT 264,
264-65 (Dieter Feddersen et al. eds., 1996).
17. See CLARK, supra note 16, at 357-400 (providing an overview of federal
proxy regulation). See also Bernard S. Black, Next Steps in Proxy Reform, 18 J.
CORP. L. 1, 2 (1993) [hereinafter Black, Proxy Reform]; Thomas W. Briggs, Share-
holder Activism and Insurgency Under the New Proxy Rules, 50 Bus. LAW. 99, 99
(1994); Douglas G. Smith, A Comparative Analysis of the Proxy Machinery in Ger-
many, Japan, and the United States: Implications for the Political Theory of Amer-
ican Corporate Finance, 58 U. PriT. L. REV. 145, 190 (1996) (providing an over-
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The above-mentioned situation concerning the reluctance
of shareholders to attend annual meetings seems to be even
more true in a giant publicly-held American corporation, in
which there is generally no controlling shareholder, but a wide-
spread mass of shareholders. 8 The high degree of ownership
fragmentation reduces the likelihood of shareholders coming
together to efficiently supervise management from the out-
set.9 Proxy voting was provided by New York State Law as
early as 1811 and became the dominant method in all states
soon thereafter.0 At that early stage, however, the question of
who would exercise the proxies on behalf of the shareholders
remained to be answered. Interestingly enough, management
itself, i.e., the corporate agent that was supposed to be over-
seen by the shareholders, could fill the gap. Strong nationwide
intermediaries, such as banks, or large stockholders, both of
whom had an incentive to monitor, did not exist in the fast
developing country. Additionally, the state laws did not consid-
er classical conflict of interest situations and therefore did not
impose restrictions on those who could act as proxy holders.2'
These factual and legal circumstances were an open invitation
to management to take over and to start soliciting proxies for
the shareholders of their corporation.
This, of course, amplified an inherent problem of (proxy)
voting and agency relationships in general: In order to exercise
the suffrage intelligently, to give instructions on how to vote to
the proxy holder or to take advantage of the revocability of the
proxy, one needs material (correct and full) information on
corporate affairs. In this respect, management acting as proxy
holder gains from the overwhelming strategic advantage of
access, not only to the corporate treasury for the sometimes
substantial costs of solicitation, but also to the detailed infor-
mation on the performance of the corporation and management
view of the 1992 revisions).
18. One example is AT&T, which remains the nation's most widely held stock
corporation with 3.2 million shareholders. See Daniel Kadlec, Ailing AT&T Hires A
Printer, TIME, Nov. 4, 1996, at 70.
19. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 4-7.
20. See Leonard H. Axe, Corporate Proxies, 41 MICH. L. REV. 38, 42-46 (1942)
(detailing the origins of express charter authority to vote by proxy).
21. See WILLIAM C. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND
MATERtIALS 331 (7th ed. 1995) (stating that "[sltate law hardly regulated proxy
voting except in the extreme case in which proxies had been fraudulently solicit-
ed").
500 [Vol. XXIV:2
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itself. The shareholder's inferior knowledge puts him at the
mercy of a proxy holder who is very likely to be self-interested.
Unregulated, this proxy system sounds like an irresistible
temptation for self-perpetuating and irresponsible manage-
ment.22 And in fact, in the 1930s, when there were periods of
major changes and high volatility in the capital markets, en-
dangered management often abused the proxy system.'
This abuse came to an end when federal securities laws
were promulgated in 1934. The newly-created Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) became a type of state guardian
of the proxy system, and it was furnished with the power to
draft even more detailed rules. The regulations have supple-
mented state law from that period on. However, these regula-
tions did not limit the ability of management to solicit prox-
ies.24 Not surprisingly, a primary emphasis of the federal laws
had to be on "full disclosure." As the important Regulation 14a
now stands, it consists of 14 rules and specifies, together with
Schedule 14A, the information required in the proxy state-
ment.2 This document, in writing, must be sent to the SEC
prior to management's (or others') solicitation of shareholders'
approval for a specific corporate matter. Among other things,
this ensures sufficient and understandable information about
the action, a standard form of presentation, as well as timely
delivery of the information to the shareholders. The SEC is
supposed to examine the filed proxy material. However, the
SEC examines whether the information given satisfies the
proxy rules, rather than formally investigates whether the
information is materially accurate and complete. The material
accuracy of management communication with the shareholders
in the proxy statements is mainly subject to the federal
antifraud rule barring material misstatements and omis-
22. See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 431 (3d ed. 1995).
23. See CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 21, at 331 (observing that "[albuses
were notorious and widespread").
24. See ALFRED F. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 329 (1976) (com-
menting that "[p]erhaps the most striking omission of the proxy system in the
U.S. is the absence of any imperative provision for independent representation.
The proxies . . . commonly are . . . solicited on behalf of the officers. Thus the
directors are elected by the same officers whom they will appoint").
25. For a critical analysis of the underlying behavioral assumptions of the
proxy rules, see EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 82.
BROOK. J. INTL L.
sions.26 Additionally, a shareholder aggrieved by disclosure
failure may bring a civil suit against the corporation, 27 al-
though this private cause of action has been increasingly nar-
rowed by courts.28 Therefore, even under federal law, it has
not been easy to police management disclosure in proxy state-
ments. Even today, it is still true that management controls
the "proxy machinery" and that shareholders tend to vote over-
whelmingly in support of management's recommendation.
Given the grossly excessive costs of drafting a proxy statement
and triggering a proxy fight, it is extremely difficult for small,
widely-scattered shareholders to contest management's propos-
als." In order to overcome the concentration of managerial
power, the federal laws have always provided shareholders
with a device to end their passive role through contacting other
shareholders, or to regard non-management proposals and
statements on corporate matters. Under the so-called "proposal
rule" an individual shareholder with a minimum stake in the
corporate enterprise may prepare his or her own resolution
and demand that it be included in the management's proxy
statement and voted on by other shareholders at the annual
meeting."' However, even though this sounds like a powerful
right to challenge a badly-performing managing group, it is
quite limited. It cannot relate to the election of directors or to
a management proposal, and it may not reach the "ordinary
business operations" of the company. 2 When looking for oth-
26. See Federal Proxy Rules, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14-a9(a) (1997).
27. For a more thorough discussion of corporate disclosure, see JAMES A.
FANTO, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AMERICAN AND FRENCH LAW 42 (1997); CLARK,
supra note 16, at 386-89; J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
28. See, e.g., Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
29. WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE 123 (6th ed. 1996). See also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 6, at
86 (emphasizing that there is no evidence that shareholders have any interest in
the information provided).
30. To contest management's recommendations, a shareholder is supported by
the "mail their stuff or give them a list" rule, which provides that management
must also mail out proxy materials supplied by a security holder that deal with
the same subject matter as the management's proposal does. See Federal Proxy
Rules, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14-7 (1997). Instead of forwarding the security holder's
materials, management may give the securities holder a current list of the names
and addresses of the security holders that are to be solicited. See CLARK, supra
note 16, at 370-71.
31. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1997). Under this rule, the printing and mail-
ing expenses are borne by the company rather than by the shareholder.
32. See FANTO, supra note 27, at 41. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d) provides that if
502 [Vol. XXIV:2
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er, less formal and less restricted possibilities of communica-
tion, shareholders have long been deterred by the proxy rules
themselves. The sweeping legal definition of "solicitation" and
"proxy," which was intended to prevent management from
circumventing the effect of the rules, unintentionally served to
bar shareholders from contacting each other in order to gain
support to oppose managements' policies.33 Thus, in 1992, the
SEC amended those rules. In particular, shareholders are now
permitted to publicly announce how they want to vote and to
give reasons for that.34 In this respect, a shareholder who de-
livers an announcement simply tries to convince others to vote
in a certain way. Having no proxy statement, he still cannot
vote as a proxy for other shareholders. Most likely, large
shareholders, such as the increasingly important pension,
mutual, or bank trust funds (so-called institutional investors),
or even outsiders having an incentive to influence the business
policies of the corporation, in one way or another will take
advantage of the new rules. Having been "sleeping giants"
35
for quite some time, they seem now fully aware of their poten-
tial to monitor management. They may try to replace incum-
bent management, rather than bear the transaction costs of
selling their significant stake in a company. In light of the new
proxy regulations, the development of corporate structures
might be similar to those found in Germany in the long
term.36
management believes a shareholder proposal can be excluded from the
corporation's proxy statement under Rule 14a-8, it must submit to the SEC a
statement ("no-action letter") stating the reasons why it deems omission of the
proposal to be proper. The SEC has been highly inconsistent in applying the no-
tion of "ordinary business matters." See, e.g., Roosevelt v. E.I. DuPont, 958 F.2d
416, 428 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
33. See FANTO, supra note 27, at 31; Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note
13, at 537-41; Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside
Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 894-95
(1991).
34. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(2)(iv) (1997).
35. See Robert A.G. Monks, Schlafende Riesen, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
OPTIMIERUNG DER UNTERNEHMENSFOHRUNG UND DER UNTERNEHMENSKONTROLLE IM
DEUTSCHEN UND AMERIKANISCHEN AKTIENRECHT 331, 331 (Dieter Feddersen et al.
eds., 1996).
36. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 230 (1994).
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B. "Depository Voting" in Germany
More than thirty years ago, when the last substantial
reformation of the German Stock Corporation Act
(Aktiengesetz) took place, one of the most important issues was
the regulation of the proxy voting system. As can be seen from
the official records of the law-making process and commentary
on the outcome, the lawyers who were involved in the legisla-
tion carefully studied U.S. proxy voting and its development
after the promulgation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
However, possibly due to some kind of "path dependance,"37
the legislators decided not to adopt the American system, as
was weakly proposed in the early 1960s."8 Instead, they
agreed to improve the legal framework for the special form of
proxy voting which had been prevalent since the beginning of
corporate law in Germany: Ever since, banks have been exer-
cising voting on behalf of the shareholders in the annual share-
holder meetings. Although it worked fairly well, this "deposito-
ry voting" (Depotstimmrecht) has been subject to ongoing dis-
cussion for various reasons. In 1996, even the "Deutscher
Juristentag," a convention of more than two thousand lawyers
which takes place every other year, put this important corpo-
rate governance issue on its schedule. However, the convention
did not agree to a proposal that included major changes. 9 Its
resolution reflects a mixture of uneasiness, a feeling that there
has to be some kind of modification, as well as reluctance to
move away from a successful model. This is equally true re-
garding the rather minor amendments that have come into
force recently (so-called Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz
im Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG), reform of the Aktiengesetz
suggesting better control and transparency in corporate law).
In the context of the present economic development in Germa-
37. See Mark J. Roe, Chaos And Evolution In Law And Economics, 109 HARV.
L. REv. 641, 641 (1996). For the current changes, see infra Part C.
38. See RUDOLF WIETHOLTER, INTERESSEN UND ORGANISATION DER
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT IM AMERIKANISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN RECHT 334-36 (1961).
39. See Deutscher Juristentag beendet kein Scherbengericht ilber Karlsruhe.
Kongress schwidcht seine Forderungen in vielen Punkten deutlich ab, SODDEUTSCHE
ZEITUNG, Sept. 21, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Zeitng File;
Karlsruhe: Juristentag; Abendmeldung-Einschriinkung des Vollmachtsstimmrechts
abgelehnt, AP WORLDSTREM - GERMAN, Sept. 19, 1996, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Allnws File; Carsten Schifer, Tagungsbericht zum Deutschen Juristentag,
Abteilung Wirtschaftsrecht, 52 JURISTENZEITUNG 137, 139 (1997).
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ny, especially in its capital markets, and more frequent disrup-
tions on the corporate landscape,4" the issue seems unsettled
at this point. Even after the recent amendment, the question
remains whether some features of the present proxy voting
system can remain the same in different circumstances, or
whether there should be some kind of change, either by further
enhancing the regulations of the proxy holders' duties, by pro-
viding a legal alternative in form of a modified "European
version" of proxy voting American style, or even by leaving the
old ways behind and radically transferring to the American
way.
1. A Brief Historical Retrospective
At first glance, there appears to be no real equivalent to
those American proxy rules under German corporate or securi-
ties laws. That is not to say that the German Stock Corpora-
tion Act (Aktiengesetz) does not provide for voting by proxy. In
fact, it mentions this device explicitly.4' Concurrently, it rec-
ognizes the common practice that is often referred to as "depos-
itory voting right of banks" (Depotstimmrecht der Banken).
At the outset, it is important to mention that this notion is
somewhat misleading. It is an illustrative description of a
factual observation rather than a legal term. Since the begin-
ning of corporate law in Germany, country banks have most
commonly exercised the proxy voting on behalf of the share-
holders who deposited their shares in the vaults of these
banks. To gain a better understanding of this, it seems useful
to highlight some background information on the close, or even
symbiotic relationship, between banks and industry in Germa-
ny.
Historically, the dominance of banks is closely tied, if not
40. A striking example is Krupp AG's hostile takeover bid for its bigger rival
Thyssen AG in March 1997, which eventually could not be consummated. There
are very few examples of hostile takeovers in German corporate history. There has
only been one successful large hostile takeover in recent years, Krupp's hostile
takeover of Hoesch AG in 1991. Another attempt, namely Hochtief AG's bid for
Philipp Holzmann AG, is still bogged down in legal wrangling with the Federal
Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt). See Thyssen says Krupp-Hoesch takeover bid sets
'bad precedent', EXTEL EXAMINER, Mar. 18, 1997, available in LEXIS, Europe Li-
brary, Alleur File; Crash im Revier, DER SPIEGEL, Mar. 24, 1997, at 92.
41. See AktG § 134(3). 'The voting rights may be exercised by proxy"
(Vollmachtsstimmrecht).
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inseparable, from the development of corporate law in Germa-
ny, and vice versa. When discussing corporate law in Germany,
we have to keep in mind that the Aktiengesellschaft (stock
corporation) was designed mainly for large enterprises. As
lately as 1965, German legislation abolished a provision de-
manding a minimum par value per share of 1000
Deutschmarks. This law attracted only a "happy few" to invest
in corporations.42 In the middle of 19th century, Germany
(then comparably underdeveloped), tried hard to keep up with
the then-more industrialized countries, especially England.
Being politically divided into different countries with their own
domestic markets and currencies, raising capital across the
borders was not easy. A patent deficiency of savings, coupled
with a lack of well-developed capital markets, did not create a
positive starting point for German industry. A successful in-
corporation43 needed to be leveraged: The upturn of the corpo-
rate form could be achieved only after the foundation of banks
being corporations themselves. Some of those banks still exist
today, known as "Grossbanken." These banks were designed as
a type of financial supermarket, offering commercial credit,
brokering and investment services, among other services. In
other words, the German universal banks rocked the cradle of
the stock corporation."
In those days, the average attendance of shareholders at
annual meetings was disappointingly low, which made it easy
for management to control, or even buy votes if necessary. It
was not until the concept of "shareholder democracy" was in-
troduced in the German Commercial Code in 1884 (Allgemeines
Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch),45 and the number and disper-
42. See Bernhard Grossfeld, Zur Stellung des Kleinaktiondirs im
Wirtschaftssystem, 30 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 1, 2 (1985). For a brief description
of the most recent developments concerning the so-called "Kleine
Aktiengesellschaft" (small corporation), see discussion infra Part D.
43. As one scholar has noted, corporate legislation at this time was still con-
fined to the various German countries. "The first statute to regulate corporations
in Germany was the Prussian Law of 1838 relating solely to railroad corporations.
A few years later, the more general Prussian Law of 1843 was enacted." 1 ENNO
W. ERCKLENTZ, JR., MODERN GERiAN CORPORATION LAW 3 (1979).
44. See WmHELM VALiENTHN, DIE STIMIRECHTSVERTRETUNG DURCH BANKEN 8
(1966).
45. Id. at 9. See also KARSTEN SCHMIDT, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 770 (1997)
(stating that the reform of 1884 is one of the most important in the history of
stock corporation law in Germany).
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sion of small shareholders slowly increased, that proxy voting
by banks became a significant feature of German corporate
governance. Since the inertia of the larger number of share-
holders remained the same, the underlying idea was to protect
the continuity and independence of decisions on fundamental
corporate matters.46 A permanent representation of the share-
holders by banks was supposed to guarantee a well-attended
meeting. The decisions made were supposed to reflect the opin-
ions of all the shareholders, not only of those few who were
present at the annual meeting. For this reason (contrary to the
American practice), there was no need for quorum require-
ments, although the articles of incorporation could specifically
provide for them.
Of course, it was not only proficiency in financial questions
and the above-described close relationship with the corpora-
tions which seemed to make the banks a perfect intermediary
between a company and its shareholders. At the same time,
the banks deposited, and currently still do, the shares in their
vaults.47 Although the law provided for registered shares as in
the United States,4" German corporations and shareholders
who wanted to remain anonymous for tax and other reasons
overwhelmingly preferred shares in bearer form.49 A bearer
share does not require an endorsement by its owner to be con-
veyed, but is transferred simply by agreement and delivery of
the certificates."0 Thus, it is a highly negotiable piece of paper
46. VALLENTHIN, supra note 44, at 10.
47. It should be noted that the usual practice of banks today is to pass on
their holdings to the licensed security holding bank (Deutsche Clearing AG, for-
merly Deutscher Kassenverein), which credits the bank with the number of securi-
ties deposited. See HANS WORDINGER, GERMAN COMPANY LAw 30-31 (1975).
48. In fact, until 1965, registered shares were deemed the legal rule, whereas
bearer shares had to be provided for explicitly in the charters and by-laws, al-
though the corporate practice had long embarked on a different track. See HGB §
183(1), AktG, v. 30.01.1937 (RGB1. I S.107) § 17(1); Bernhard Frhr. von
Falkenhausen, Das Bankenstimmrecht im neuen Aktienrecht, 11 DIE
AKTIENGESELLScHAFT 69 (1966).
49. See Detlev F. Vagts, Reforming The Modern Corporation: Perspectives From
The German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23, 53-56 (1966) [hereinafter Vagts, Perspectives
From The German]. This preference is quite stubborn. It not only survived attacks
by the Nazis, who deemed the "anonymity" of the corporation to be highly danger-
ous, but also from the American-led allied occupation authorities, who were trou-
bled by greatly concentrated enterprises and the influence in the hands of the
banks. Id.; von Falkenhausen, supra note 48, at 70.
50. See BUrgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) [Civil Code] § 929.
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which demands, just like cash, secure deposit to prevent theft,
destruction, or loss.5 Since the banks already had the shares
in their custody, it was convenient to add another service for
the mainly disinterested shareholders: the exercise of the right
to vote.52
Initially, there was no need seen for statutory guidance of
the voting function of the depositing banks. This made it easy
for the banks to appropriate this function to themselves, sim-
ply by including a blanket authorization as a kind of
preprinted term of business in every deposit agreement. This
of course put the shareholders more or less at mercy of the
performance of the banks and raises questions of the original
link between "shareholder democracy" and depository voting.
Parallel to the situation in the United States, it was the strug-
gling economy in the 1920s and 1930s which caused wide-
spread misuse of voting rights that did not fully reflect the
shareholder interests." Following legislative activism in the
United States, the customarily developed depository voting was
regulated statutorily as late as 1937. Since the statute 4 solely
concentrated on the form and duration of the authorization in
order to narrow the banks' leeway, it was up to the last great
reform of the Aktiengesetz in 1965 to address conflict of inter-
est issues which had also been a strong part of the previous
criticism.55
51. Today, however, the influence of this feature on corporate governance
issues should not be overestimated. Shareholders almost always receive no individ-
ual share certificates, but their stock is embodied in a single "global share certifi-
cate." See BERND SINGHOF, DIE AU13ENHAFTUNG VON EMISSIONSKONSORTEN FOR
AKTIENEINLAGEN 210 (1998); AktG, v. 06.09.1965 (BGBI. I S.1089) § 10(5) amended
by Gesetz fir kleine Aktiengesellschaften und zur Derugulierung des Aktienrechts
[Small Stock Corporation and Deregulation of the Stock Corporation Law] v.
09.08.1994 (BGB1. I S.1964) art.1 (stating that "the right to receive individual
share certificates may be excluded or restricted in the articles").
52. See Vagts, Perspectives From The German, supra note 49, at 54.
53. See Johannes K6ndgen, Duties of Banks in Voting Their Clients' Stock, in
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 531, 533 (Theodor Baums
et al. eds., 1994); ERCKLENTZ, supra note 43, at 4. Interestingly, even the
Reichsgericht (former German Supreme Court) was not concerned about the protec-
tion of shareholders' rights at the time. It upheld the legal commitments of share-
holders to vote according to the directions of management. See Dieter Eckert,
Shareholder and Management: A Comparative View On Some Corporate Problems
in the United States and Germany, 46 IOvA L. REV. 12, 33 & n.116 (1960).
54. For a more thorough discussion of § 114 of the 1937 Stock Corporation
Act, see VALLENTHIN, supra note 44, at 31-35; Vagts, Perspectives From The Ger-
man, supra note 49, at 54-55.
55. As this historical background suggests, the strong central banking system
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2. The Legal Framework for Proxy Voting"5
a. Banks as "Information Carriers"
One feature of proxy voting in Germany warrants discus-
sion at the outset. In its present codification, the Stock Corpo-
ration Act (Aktiengesetz) not only provides for proxy voting in
general,57 but explicitly acknowledges the central role of
banks in the proxy system as a given element. The Banks'
legal function as intermediaries between a corporation and its
shareholders begins as early as the preparation for an annual
meeting. As elsewhere, information to shareholders is regarded
as an essential prerequisite for voting. At the same time, it is
inherent to the dominance of the bearer shares that sharehold-
ers are widely unknown to the corporation, making direct com-
munication virtually impossible. For this reason, the corpora-
tion publishes the agenda of the annual meeting and the invi-
tations in the press.58 The publications to be used for such
purposes are listed in the articles of incorporation.59 In addi-
tion to this rather insufficient device, AktG section 125 re-
quires that the managing board send copies of the agenda prior
to the annual meeting to all banks that exercised the right to
vote at the last assembly, or asked for the information. Man-
agement has to include its recommendations and comments on
in Germany is not of recent origin. In other words, it is not, as some authors
allege, a consequence of economic struggle and related strategy in the aftermath of
World War II. For an example of such an opinion on the matter, compare Corinne
A. Franzen, Increasing The Competitiveness of U.S. Corporations: Is Bank Moni-
toring The Answer?, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 271, 287 (1993), and Robert E.
Benfield, Curing American Managerial Myopia: Can The German System Of Corpo-
rate Governance Help?, 17 LOY. L.A. INTL & COMP. L.J. 615, 645 (1995) (stating
that "Germany was more interested in protecting an entire country than in pro-
tecting the rights of individual shareholders") with K6ndgen, Duties of Banks in
Voting Their Clients' Stock, supra note 53, at 539 ([a]fter the war, the debate was
resumed and has not yet subsided").
56. See generally AktG. The following discussion is based on the Aktiengesetz
of 1965. Current amendments of the AktG through the Gesetz zur Kontrolle und
Transparenz hn Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG) will be discussed infra Part C.
See Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG), v.
27.04.1998 (BGBl. I S.786).
57. See AktG § 134(3).
58. See AktG § 124(1).
59. Invitations to the meeting, as well as any other communications which the
corporation is legally required to make, must be published additionally in the
Federal Gazette (Bundesanzeiger). For an example of such a public notice, see
ERNST C. STEEFEL, GERMAN COMMERcIAL LAW 99 (1963).
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every subject to be voted on. Furthermore, management is
obliged to send both insurgent shareholders' counter-propos-
als,60 and nominations for the supervisory board to the
banks.6 Such a counter-proposal may only be rejected by
management if it judges that it is illegal, based on obviously
false, deceptive or defamatory statements, or the same propos-
al has failed twice within the past five years to win approval of
at least 5% of the votes cast at annual meetings.6 2 It is the
banks' duty then to promptly forward those communication
materials to the shareholders who deposited shares of the
corporation with the bank. In summary, at this stage, which
necessarily precedes an election, the bank is merely a "carrier
of information." 3
b. Banks as Proxy Holders: The Mechanics of Proxy Voting
The difficulties of communication, as noted above, may
sound familiar to an American reader: With respect to securi-
ties widely held by brokers for their clients 'in street name,"
even under the U.S. preference for registered shares, it has
become increasingly difficult to identify the "beneficial" share-
holder." Whereas under American law this seems to be a
problem for management, or opposing shareholders who want
to solicit proxies, German law presupposes that the depositing
banks who can identify the shareholders almost exclusively
exercise the proxy voting.65 At the core of the proxy process at
60. See AktG § 126(1).
61. See AktG § 127.
62. See AktG §§ 126(1), 126(2). This rule has been modeled after the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission's "proposal rule." See Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-8 (1997). See also Ernst C. Steefel & Bernhard von Falkenhausen, The
New German Stock Corporation Law, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 518, 543 (1967). Although
similar on its face, there are some striking differences: i) there are no restrictions
for eligibility to make a proposal (minimum stake) in Germany; (ii) contrary to its
American counterpart, a proposal is much shorter and may not exceed 100 words;
(iii) on the other hand, there is no concern expressed directly in the code that
proposals may challenge the "ordinary business operations" of the company; (iv)
due to the two-tier system, a proposal can relate to the election of supervisory
board members; (v) finally, German shareholders make their counterproposal with-
out incurring any financial risk because the expenses are borne by the banks and
the corporation. Id.
63. For a thorough examination of the underlying duties, see Klaus
Burmeister, Weitergabe-, Mitteilungspflichten und Stimmrechtsvollmacht far
Kreditinstitute (§ 128, 135 AktG), 21 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 262 (1976).
64. See Vagts, Perspectives From The German, supra note 49, at 56-57.
65. The portfolio-managing banks account for over 90% of the voting rights at
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this point, it should be kept in mind that, converse to the "car-
rier function," the proxy voting is not mandatory, but is in-
stead left to the discretion of the bank. As will be seen, infra,
banks do not have to be pushed anyway, because there seems
to be a strong incentive which makes them overly receptive to
exercising the proxy votes.
Banks cannot do so, however, unless authorization has
been given in writing by clients.6" This authorization, which
no longer can be part of the depository contract, may not ex-
ceed fifteen months and is revocable at any time. 7 A bank
which intends to exercise a vote must inform the shareholder
of its own proposals, regarding the exercise of the right to vote
with respect to each item on the agenda. The bank must also
ask the shareholder to give instructions on how to vote, and
point out that if the shareholder does not send in contrary
orders together with the authorization, the bank will exercise
the vote in accordance with its own suggestions communicated
to the shareholder." Even though this process implies some
sort of solicitation, it almost completely lacks the sometimes
aggressive process of systematically contacting shareholders
and urging them to execute and return proxy forms in the
United States. It is rather a boring and dry formality. As some
statistics show, in general shareholders blindly rely on the
statement of the bank, and on the average only about 1% of
the shareholders come up with their own proposals.69 At this
the annual shareholder meetings. See Hermann H. Kallfass, The American Corpo-
ration And The Institutional Investor: Are There Lessons From Abroad? The Ger-
man Experience, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 775, 782 (1988).
66. See AktG § 135(1).
67. See AktG § 135(2). Similarly, the Safekeeping of Securities Act
(Depotgesetz) provides that the document containing the authorization to deposit
shares may not refer to other documents or be joined with other statements of the
depository. See Gesetz Uber die Verwahrung und Anschaffung von Wertpapieren
(Depotgesetz) [Safekeeping of Securities Act] v. 11.01.1995 (BGBI. I S.38) § 15(2).
68. See AktG §§ 128(2), 135(5).
69. See Martin Peltzer, Empfehlen sich gesetzliche Einschrinkungen des
Einflusses der Kreditinstitute auf Aktiengesellschaften?, 51 JURISTENZEITUNG 842,
844 (1996). Other sources state that in 2-3% of all cases a special instruction oc-
curs. See Theodor Baums, Takeovers Versus Institutions in Corporate Governance in
Germany, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 151, 159 & n.24
(D.D. Prentice & P.R.J. Holland eds., 1993) [hereinafter Baums, Takeovers]. See
also Uwe H. Schneider & Ulrich Burgard, Ma/3nahmen zur Verbesserung der
Prdsenz auf der Hauptversammlung einer Aktiengesellschaft, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR
KARL BEUSCH 783, 787 (1993) [hereinafter Schneider & Burgard,
BROOK. J. INTL L.
stage there is almost no competition among the banks. Of
course, they fight for the favor of small investors who need
bank services in order to buy and sell securities. However, once
they have them as clients, there is no question that the banks
vote only the shares that are deposited in their vaults."
Given this framework, proxy voting seems quite smooth
and far less disruptive than in the United States. At this stage
of the examination, it seems that a proxy contest for corporate
control (i.e., a purely personal power contest) does not occur for
at least four reasons:7 First, as will be explored, infra, it
seems to be a well-established rule under German law that the
board of directors, as an agent of the corporation, is not al-
lowed to solicit proxies or to act as a proxy holder. 2 Second,
even though the law explicitly states that the proxy regulation
mutatis mutandis applies to the exercise of the voting rights by
shareholders' protective associations, they have not played a
significant role in corporate history so far. Third, the anonymi-
ty of the bearer share creates significant impediments to direct
shareholder communication. Finally and most importantly,
management (Vorstand) is not elected by the shareholders, but
is appointed by the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat)."3 As far
as the authors can determine, this final aspect renders the
solicitation of proxies by opposing shareholders largely uncom-
mon, if not futile.74 A contest would be staged to gain supervi-
Hauptversammlungsprisenz] (analyzing reasons and legal remedies to the de-
creasing number of shareholders participating at annual meetings).
70. Also, even though shareholders may switch from one depository bank to
another for the purpose of giving the latter one the proxy for their stock, factual
and legal circumstances create hurdles too high to make this a real alternative.
See Horst Hammen, Das Vollmachtsstimmrecht der Banken in der
Aktienrechtsreform, 51 WERTPAPIERMITrEILUNGEN 1221, 1225 (1997) [hereinafter
Hammen, Vollmachtsstimmrecht].
71. See Heinz-Dieter Assmann et al., The Law of Business Associations, in
INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 137, 146 (Werner F. Ebke & Matthew W. Finkin
eds., 1996). There may currently be more incentives for opposition in a contest
over corporate policy. Due to this lack of restrictions, German corporations recently
faced problems when some of their shareholders tried to abuse the annual meet-
ing, making it a forum to raise political issues. See Dieter Feddersen et al.,
Einfihrung, supra note 11, at 5.
72. See Philipp M~ihring, Proxy-Stimmrecht und geltendes deutsches Aktienrecht,
in FEsTscHmIFT FOR ERNST GESSLER, 127, 127 (1971); Wolfgang Zdllner, Die
Ausiibung des Stimmrechts fir fremde Aktien durch die Aktiengesellschaft auf ihrer
eigenen Hauptversammlung, in FESTSCHRIFr FOR HARRY WEsTERMANN 603, 603
(1974).
73. See AktG § 84.
74. However, it is noteworthy that under AktG § 127, a shareholder may
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sion, instead of corporate control. Quite understandably, under
this presupposition, the law sees little danger in this regard.
For example, there exists no sophisticated formal standard for
the bank's proxy statement (as opposed to the onerous SEC
filings necessary in the United States). The drafters of the
1965 statute obviously expected abuse from another direction:
A bank might only be willing to exercise the votes of those
shareholders who accept its proposals, and reject opposing
shareholders who nevertheless wish to be represented by
banks at the annual meeting. To prevent such (disapproving)
selectivity, the law imposes a legal duty on a bank to accept a
client's request to cast the vote for the client, if it previously
offered to vote another client's shares.75 This is not to say that
a bank must solicit all the votes of the shares in its vaults. It
is the shareholders' task to demand proxy voting, in order to
put the duty of acceptance on the banks. However, empirical
research shows that banks do not tend to be selective in their
voting behavior at all. Since some sort of shareholders' activity
hardly existed in the past, they rather wanted to accumulate
voting power.
c. Duties of Banks and their Judicial Enforcement
The relationship between shareholder and proxy holder
raises classical principal-agent problems. At this point, an
American reader may be concerned about the allocation of
duties on the agents' (banks') side. This "duty of care" and
"duty of loyalty" type of problem is even more striking when
one considers that the banks have remarkable leeway when
exercising the voting rights. However, in this regard, German
law is not as detailed as American law: It simply requires that
a bank, when drafting its proposals, be guided by its views of
the best interest of the shareholders,76 and only deviate from
make proposals for the appointment of members to the supervisory board. See
AktG § 127.
75. See AktG § 135(10).
76. See AktG § 128(2). The shareholders' interests are defined by academics as
those of the company, not those of the management. This is based on the interest
in the development of the share price and in the receipt of dividends, or as the
interests of a reasonable shareholder in possession of information known by the
bank. Both criteria are vague, and it may be difficult to decide whether, defined
in this manner, the shareholders' interests speak for or against a certain transac-
tion. See Georg Maier-Reimer, Protection Against Hostile Takeovers in Germany:
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a communicated voting exercise in exceptional cases. Should it
encounter materially changed circumstances at the meeting,"
the bank can depart from its generally binding proposals, if it
can assume that the shareholders would approve a different
exercise of the voting rights upon full knowledge of the
facts." After such a deviation, a bank must inform the share-
holders and state the reasons therefor. 9 Additionally, in order
to align shareholders' and banks' interests, AktG section 135
paragraph 11 provides for a private cause of action which can
be neither waived, nor limited in advance: A bank is liable for
any damage caused by a violation of paragraphs one to 3, 5, 7,
8 or 10. At the same time, under German law, the validity of
any vote cast is generally not affected by misleading proposals
or wrongly motivated deviation,"0 and a poll in an annual
meeting cannot be challenged later by means of a special law-
suit (Anfechtungsklage), which is based on an alleged violation
of the banks' duties as set forth in AktG section 128.81
It is hard to tell whether all of this creates efficient share-
holder protection, since shareholders have been reluctant to
file suits against banks, which could have given courts the
opportunity to "breathe life into" the regulations. 2 Later, in
this paper, it will be necessary to more closely examine this
problem. For now it may suffice to note another problematic
aspect: the conflict-of-interest-situation. Here, one notes some
disclosure rules that may strike Americans as both familiar
and comparatively underdeveloped. This is because the disclo-
Banks and Limitations on Voting Rights, in EUROPEAN TAKEOVERS: LAW AND
PRACTICE 242, 243 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1992).
77. It is noteworthy that upon request at the meeting, the management board
must provide information to shareholders if the information on corporate matters
is required to enable the shareholders to reach an informed opinion concerning
any item on the agenda. However, if such information causes considerable detri-
ment to the corporation, in their reasonable business judgment, managers may
refuse to furnish this particular information. See AktG § 131.
78. See AktG § 135(5).
79. See AktG § 135(8).
80. See AktG § 135(6).
81. See AktG § 243(3).
82. One remarkable exception is a recent court judgment which imposed a
duty on the defendant, Hypo-Bank, to give reasons for a certain voting proposal
which it had drafted. Once again, "Scary" Ekkehard Wenger, a professor of eco-
nomics, acted on behalf of the plaintiff shareholders. See Themen des Tages: Ein
Urteil mit Fernwirkung, SfJDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Feb. 12, 1994, available in LEXIS
World Library, Zeitng File.
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sure rules only address three points. First, a bank clearly has
to state whether it votes its own stock or whether it votes on
behalf of a principal.' Second, if a member of the bank's
managing board is also a member of the company's supervisory
board, or, if a member of the company's managing board is a
member of the bank's supervisory board, the bank has to dis-
close this fact in its proxy statement.' Third, it is noteworthy
to mention that at least the big, most influential banks are
giant, publicly-held corporations themselves. They may vote in
their own annual meetings as a proxy only so far as the share-
holder has given express instructions with respect to the items
of the agenda. In contrast to German industrial corporations,
here the American and the German proxy systems seem to be
quite similar: A bank's management, just like its American
counterpart, may vote the bank's own stock on the annual
meeting, if specifically instructed. Obviously, German law
wants to protect the banks' institutional function in the proxy
system and elsewhere by barring any (in particular other
banks) influence from outside.
C. Path Dependence versus Transition: The Present Discussion
and Reform in Germany
Looking back over the past thirty years, one can say that
the makers of the 1965 Stock Corporation Act failed to settle
the discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of
depository voting. It has been going on since then, sometimes
with more, sometimes with less vigor. As mentioned above,
recently Germany had "peak season." But once again it did not
lead to major changes. This time, however, not only did Ger-
man lawyers endeavor to enhance the present system by ad-
dressing its various conflict-of-interest problems, but also came
up with revolutionary proposals: After having been taboo for
ages, even the abolition of depository voting was not beyond
debate any more.
83. See AktG § 135(4). As a rule, however, a depository bank has special
authority from its client to exercise voting rights on a basis of "to whomsoever the
voting right belongs." Id. In this case the attendance list sets out only the name
of the bank and the amount and class of shares which the bank votes in this
way. Thus, the corporation may never know who its shareholders are! See
WORDINGER, supra note 47, at 34.
84. See AktG § 128(2).
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1. The Notion of "Bank Power" (Macht der Banken)
To get a complete impression of the criticism, one has to
consider that it has not been sparked by bad performance of
banks as proxy holders, but by the accumulated involvement of
banks in corporate affairs. In the absence of a Glass-Steagall
Act, a Bank Holding Company Act or an Investment Company
Act, German universal banks offer the whole range of classical
banking services." In other words, the banks give commercial
loans and investment advice, engage in underwriting and trad-
ing new securities issues, organize rescue operations for firms
in financial distress, and are active in the mergers and acquisi-
tions sector. Most importantly, banks own stock in industrial
firms. 6 It is easy to see that all of these give them ample op-
portunity to play an important role in corporate governance.
The characteristic German situation has been discussed and
statistically backed up with quite impressive numbers else-
where, and therefore need not to be repeated here.87 Most
people are aware of the striking example of Deutsche Bank
holding about 25% of Daimler Benz' equity. This figure be-
comes even more striking when recognizing that the bank's
subsidiaries, such as investment funds, may add other shares
to its voting power. Together with the proxy votes, all this can
add up to a controlling minority voting power which can both
85. See AktG § 135(1); Hwa-Jin Kim, Markets, Financial Institutions, and
Corporate Governance: Perspectives From Germany, 26 LAW & POLY INTL BUS.
371, 377 (1995); Hans E. Biischgen, The Universal Banking System in the Federal
Republic of Germany, 2 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 1 (1979).
86. For a description of the factual and legal background of bank participation
in Germany, see Ulrich Immenga, Participatory Investment By Banks: A Structural
Problem Of The Universal Banking System in Germany, 2 J. COMP. CORP. L. &
SEC. REG. 29, 31-35 (1979); Michael Gruson, Banking Regulation and Treatment of
Foreign Banks in Germany, in REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS: UNITED STATES
AND INTERNATIONAL § 15.07 (Michael Gruson & Ralph Reisner eds., 1995). Invest-
ments must not exceed a specified percentage of the capital of the investing bank.
See Gesetz diber das Kreditwesen [Banking Law], v. 30.01.1996 (BGBl. I S.65), §§
12(5), 13. Also, investment in banks by insurance companies, and vice versa, is
restricted. See Michael Gruson & Uwe H. Schneider, The German Landesbanken,
1995 COLUm. BUS. L. REV. 337, 341 & n.3 (1995).
87. For a profound analysis, see JEREMY EDWARDS & KLAUS FISCHER, BANKS,
FINANCE AND INVESTMENT IN GERMANY 111-21, 198-214 (1994); Theodor Baums &
Christian Fraune, Institutionelle Anleger und Publikumsgesellschaft: Eine empirische
Untersuchung, 40 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 97 (1995). See also 6 ZErISCHRIFT FOR
BANKRECHT UND BANKWIRTScHAFT 69 (1994) (documenting bank power provided at
a parliamentary hearing of the Deutscher Bundestag in December 1993).
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initiate and block certain decisions.88 Additionally, members
of the managing or supervisory board of a bank, even if the
bank does not own stock in the firm, are encouraged to become
members of the supervisory board of the firm. Today, this is
the case in more than half of the 100 largest publicly-held
corporations in Germany.89 Nevertheless, those examples of-
ten tend to oversimplify and open the floodgates to a rather
irrational discussion. In the proxy setting, it is said that the
"big three" (Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and
Commerzbank), exercise a corporate governance role similar to
that of management in the United States. 0 This is true to
some degree. However, no single bank holds, as far as can be
seen, a majority of depository votes. The "giant banks" have to
share their direct influence on the corporation with many
small, regional, private banks and municipal savings banks
(Sparkassen).9' It is no exception that as many as fifty banks
show up at the annual meeting.2 In general, it should be not-
ed that the bankers' vote implies the advantage that power
over the corporation is more widely spread.93 Of course, the
88. See Jeremy Edwards & Klaus Fischer, An Overview of the German Finan-
cial System, in CAPITAL MARKETS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 257, 273 (Nicholas
Dimsdale & Martha Prevezer eds., 1994). Bank's control of voting rights is great-
est among the top ten German publicly-held corporations by nominal capital. Id.
Prior to the recent amendment of the Aktiengesetz, limitations on voting rights of
shareholders (H6chststimmrechte, e.g., no single shareholder can vote more than
5% of the total share capital), when included in the articles of incorporation as a
hostile takeover protection, increased the bank's influence even further. A bank
voting shares for several customers was not affected by the limitations because
they exclusively related to the shareholder. See Maier-Reimer, supra note 76, at
244, 247. H6chststimmrechte are nothing but history as regards corporations whose
shares are listed on a stock exchange. After a transitional period the limitations
on voting rights will become void. See AktG § 134(1); Einfihrungsgesetz zum
Aktiengesetz (EGAktG) [Implementing Legislation], v. 27.04.1998 (BGB1. I S.786) §
5(7).
89. See Marcus Lutter, Macht der Banken, 34 NEuE JuEISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFr 2766 (1995) [hereinafter Lutter, Macht der Banken].
90. See ROE, supra note 36, at 170-71.
91. On average the "big three" banks together exercise 45-47% of all proxies
at an annual meeting. See Edwards & Fischer, supra note 88, at 272.
92. Giinther H. Roth, Supervision of Corporate Management: The "Outside" Di-
rector and the German Experience, 51 N.C. L. REV. 1369, 1379 (1973).
93. Bernhard Grossfeld & Werner Ebke, Controlling the Modern Corporation:
A Comparative View of Corporate Power in the United States and Europe, 26 AM.
J. COmp. L. 397, 415 (1978). See also ROE, supra note 36, at 171 (stating that "an
American intermediary trying to control 5 percent or 10 percent of the largest
industrial firm's stock would be akin to a pup trying to grab a lion").
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small regional banks that seem to seek a closer relationship
with private clients, such as small shareholders, cannot afford
a paper-wasting monitoring function, and, parallel to their cli-
ents, they may realize how limited their influence is. They rely
to a large extent on the proposals of the big banks. It seems in
this context that it is "collective action" of the banks that is
feared most. When turning to the banks' possible incentives for
corporate control in order to carve out inherent conflict of in-
terest problems, it is inevitable to focus solely on the big
banks.
2. Incentives to Exercise Proxy Votes and
Related Conflicts of Interest
Banks do not charge extra fees for voting their clients'
stock. There is only a basic fee for their depository service,
which is not tied to performance.94 From a corporate point of
view, this is very cost-efficient for the corporation itself be-
cause its funds are not burdened with the (as the American
experience shows) sometimes enormously high costs in a proxy
process. Theoretically, the shareholders also benefit from this
distribution of the costs: It leaves more assets to the corpora-
tion, which makes it more likely that the shareholders' return
(dividend) is higher than otherwise. On the other hand, it is
hard to believe that the banks, when exercising the voting
rights, act solely as a selfless proxy with no return and without
pursuit of their own economic interests. They could not have
stayed in the market, had that been their 'philosophy' of doing
business in the last thirty years. This creates a latent risk that
the banks deviate from shareholders' interests, if this fits their
interests better. However, it also does not suggest that the
banks interests and the shareholders' interests can never be
the same. To some degree, an agent with some incentive to
care and to investigate the market situation is even more de-
sirable than a completely disinterested agent who is just per-
forming a job. Empirical data on how banks actually make use
of their voting power is not obtainable. There is only one often-
cited finding that banks exercising the proxy votes usually side
94. See Theodor Baums, Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of the
Banks, 40 Am. J. COhiP. L. 503, 506 (1992) [hereinafter Baums, Corporate Gover-
nance].
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with the company's management. 5 Still, we cannot conclude
from this that the outcome of the voting process is not distinct
from proxy voting by management itself. Banks may well put
recognizable pressure on badly performing management in
previous internal negotiations and force management to modify
its proposals.96 To make a long story short, it is best to start
from the hypothesis that the banks' incentive to monitor flows
mainly from their various other stakes in German industry,
and then to evaluate on these hypothetical grounds whether
the shareholders' prerogative in deciding how to cast their
votes is safeguarded efficiently under the present law.
To begin with, banks are shareholders themselves and
therefore may try to protect their own equity investment. 7
The additional voting power by proxy votes, which is not tied
to a higher financial stake in the company (power without
property) gives them an ideal leverage to pursue this aim.
Even though equity holding seems to put them on the side of
their clients, their interests can still differ. Probably, a bank
sees stock simply as an investment that helps to diversify its
portfolio in order to maintain stability, rather than to receive a
high dividend return. This leads to the dividend policy of firms
in general. Because of their conservative image in the public,
banks have been suspected of having supported the restrictive
dividend policy of management, instead of pleading for a profit-
able policy that aims at maximizing share value." Also, as
providers for external credit finance, banks seem to prefer that
a company retains its earnings, in order to make sure that its
95. See generally Kdndgen, Duties of Banks in Voting Their Clients' Stock,
supra note 53, at 538; Alfred E. Conard, The Supervision of Corporate Manage-
ment: A Comparison Of Developments in European Community and United States
Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1459, 1470 (1984); Thomas Raiser, Empfehlen sich
gesetzliche Regelungen zur Einschriinkung des Einflusses der Kreditinstitute auf
Aktiengesellschaften?, 35 NEUE JuRISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2257, 2261 (1996)
[hereinafter Raiser, Einflu3 der Kreditinstitute].
96. As Westermann and Hopt point out, German banks frequently vote
against management's proposals and even support initiatives that demand special
auditing of the corporation. See Westermann, Vollmachtstimmrecht, supra note 16,
at 270; Klaus J. Hopt, Corporate Governance und deutsche Universalbanken, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: OPTIMIERUNG DER UNTERNEHMENSFUEHRUNG UND DER
UNTERNEHMENSKONTROLLE IM DEUTSCHEN UND IM AMERIKANISCHEN AKTIENRECHT
243, 258 (Dieter Feddersen et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter Hopt, Corporate Gover-
nance].
97. See Baums, Takeovers, supra note 69, at 170.
98. Id. at 174-75.
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credit claim can be satisfied.99 Again, there is another version
of the story: Since this credit investment in particular is le-
verage to discipline management, its interests may depart from
banks' interests at this point. Understandably, it must be
management's aim to become increasingly independent from
external finance through piling up the internal corporate
funds. In response, this may lead banks to favor the distribu-
tion of dividends.' Idealistically, a bank can therefore recon-
cile detrimental extremes and help to stay in the middle of the
road, to the best interest of the corporation and its sharehold-
ers: From a long term perspective, neither excessive distribu-
tion of dividends nor stubborn retaining of earnings serves the
best interests of the involved parties.
This, of course, demands much from a bank as a monitor.
It may be reluctant to fulfill this role diligently because, be-
yond a certain input, it does not pay off. Additionally, German
banks seek a more stable relationship with corporate custom-
ers than is the case in the United States. As house-bank
(Hausbank), a German bank can deliver all the banking servic-
es a corporation needs. This "principle of relationship banking,"
along with the universal bank system, offers German banks a
great deal of business opportunities.'' Even though publicly-
held corporations establish up to ten "house-bank relation-
ships," and a number of connections with other banks, the
common reluctance of the banks to be deprived of this impor-
99. Under German law, bank credit is not repayable capital of the corporation
in a bankruptcy proceeding if the credit is given by banks with major holdings in
the corporation (i.e., more than 25% of the outstanding stock). See BGHZ [Supreme
Court] 90, 381 (382). See also Klaus J. Hopt, Inside Information and Conflicts of
Interest of Banks and Other Financial Intermediaries in European Law, in EURO-
PEAN INSIDER TRADING 219, 232 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1991)
[hereinafter Hopt, Inside Information].
100. It is noteworthy that generally the dependence of large publicly-held corpo-
rations on debt financing is only approximately 8.8%. This small percentage is due
to their ability to raise equity capital and accumulate substantial amounts of liq-
uid assets through internal financing. It is true that German companies rely on
debt financing rather than on equity financing, considering the large number of
limited liability companies (Gesellschaften mit beschriinkter Haftung). See Ellen R.
Schneider-Lennd, The Role of the German Capital Markets and the Universal
Banks, Supervisory Boards, and Interlocking Directorships, in CAPITAL MARKETS
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 284, 286 (Nicholas Dimsdale & Martha Prevezer
eds., 1994). However, for huge projects which require much more money for a
certain period of time, even big enterprises may hire a credit consortium.
101. Id. at 286.
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tant business relationship might be a disincentive to bother
management with close monitoring until after a bail-out situa-
tion arises.0 2 Late in 1995, Deutsche Bank experienced how
embarrassing such a snub can be. Daimler Benz, Germany's
largest industrial company, rejected the German banking titan
when it needed investment banking prowess. Instead, Daimler
turned to Goldman, Sachs & Company for help revamping its
A.E.G. industrial unit, and later picked J.P. Morgan as lead
manager to raise $500 million.0 3 One can only hope that the
branch of the highly competitive commercial banking sector, or
stated differently, an undoubtedly increasing consciousness
about a good performance in buying, selling and administering
shares for small investors, outbalances this hesitation to moni-
tor efficiently. However, it seems hard to rebut the presump-
tion that a bank commits its heart and soul to an individual
corporation, rather than to a widely dispersed mass of silent
investors. Stated differently, from time to time management of
one of the big three banks (which themselves are corporations
with scattered ownership), is overly sympathetic with the man-
agement of an industrial company.0 4 Again, Daimler Benz is
a striking example which supports this contention. In 1996,
the members of the managing and the supervisory boards were
released from responsibility by a shareholder's resolution,1"5
which was dominated by banks exercising the proxies. As a
matter of law, by this release the shareholders approved the
conduct of the company's management, 6 although the com-
pany faced heavy losses, and some managerial decisions were
clearly wrong, such as the acquisition of Fokker. Even though
102. See Baums, Takeovers, supra note 69, at 172; Vagts, supra note 49, at 61;
Bernhard Grossfeld, Management and Control of Marketable Share Companies, in 8
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAw 99, 99 (A. Conard ed., 1973).
A recent case of an emergency intervention by banks which suggested that they
had been "sleeping" for a while was the derivatives-related financial distress of
Metallgesellsehaft. It required a collective effort by several big banks and probably
could have been prevented by a more effective ex ante control. See Joseph L.
Motes, Ill, A Primer on the Trade and Regulation of Derivative Instruments, 49
SMU L. REv. 579, 608 (1996).
103. See Peter Truell & Edmund L. Andrews, Accelerating a Risky Strate-
gy--Deutsche Bank Continues Plunge Into Qlobal Banking, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31,
1996, at D1.
104. See Baums, Takeovers, supra note 69, at 172.
105. See AktG §§ 120, 119(1).
106. See AktG § 120(2).
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this release could not imply a waiver of claims for damag-
es, 10 7 and of course some managers were informally forced to
resign, it transmitted a wrong signal: "business as usual."'0 8
From here, it is not far to discover another weak point in the
system: the representation of the banks in the supervisory
boards of industrial corporations. In our example, the fact that
banks' representatives were sitting in the supervisory board
renders the conflict of interest issue one of first impression.
However, as seen from the above discussion, things are not
always that obvious, and we have investigated highly specula-
tive grounds. The fact pattern is anecdotal, imprecise, if not
opaque.0 9 This makes it even more difficult to design an effi-
cient improvement of the present system. To sum up, one can
say that, regardless of its advantages, the German system
certainly bears potential for abuses triggered by conflict-of-
interest situations. Even though the issue is supposedly stron-
ger in the management-dominated U.S. proxy system, in this
dimension both systems are more like each other than one may
have expected at the outset. It is questionable whether conflict-
of-interest situations are properly addressed by German
law.10
3. Selected Aspects of Recent Proposals for Reform
Over the last couple of years German lawyers and political
parties have come up with a series of proposals on how to
enhance, or substitute, the present depository voting without
losing the advantage of having a professional and responsive
outside monitor whose presence overcomes a still prevalent
shareholder passivity. Not all of the proposals were new, and
now, particularly after the Deutscher Juristentag dismissed
changes of far-reaching importance in 1996, they seem nothing
107. See AktG 120(2).
108. See Peltzer, supra note 69, at 845.
109. It is noteworthy that banks find themselves in a catch-22 situation at the
present stage of the debate; they are heavily criticized no matter what they do.
For example, the participation of Deutsche Bank in a syndicate secretly preparing
the Krupp-Thyssen hostile takeover attempt in March 1997 was heavily criticized
since one of Deutsche Bank's managers was sitting on the Thyssen supervisory
board. Under these circumstances, a market for corporate control may not spark
off in Germany.
110. See Baums, Takeovers, supra note 69, at 175; Kndgen, supra note 53, at
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but history."' Yet, this temporary peak most likely has not
marked the final end to a longstanding discussion, even though
the above mentioned amendments of the Aktiengesetz have
just come into force regarding inter alia proxy voting of
banks."' Rather, the search for the best legal framework re-
mains an elusive quest. All this reveals how far apart the
positions still are: Some claim that the lawyers were not ready
for a drastic turn, and some suggestions will be revived in
time. On the other hand, major change may not be necessary
at all. To assert their value, and to get an impression of the
present stage of a seemingly ongoing discussion, it is worth-
while to glimpse some of the contributions as well as the out-
come in the Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im
Unternehmensbereich.
a. Proxy Voting by Auditors
The two most striking and similar proposals were made by
the Social Democratic Party,' and the scholars Baums and
von Randow"4 as to which independent, professional agents,
preferably auditors (Wirtschaftspriifer) or attorneys, should
exercise the proxy votes on behalf of the shareholders. Accord-
ing to the proposal, in each corporation five proxy holders
would have to be elected by the shareholders. The later exer-
cise of the proxy votes would be supervised by the Federal
Supervisory Office for Securities Trading (Bundesaufsichtsamt
far den Wertpapierhandel). The proxy holders would receive
compensation from the corporation, the amount of which must
be fixed by the Federal Minister of Justice (Bundesministerium
der Justiz).
Although reasonable and promising at first glance, the
amendment entails weak aspects which may raise old prob-
lems in different circumstances. The proposal merely substi-
111. See generally Schdfer, supra note 39. See also 36 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT 2998 (1996) (providing the results of voting).
112. The KonTraG legislation anticipates better control and transparency in
corporate law. See Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich
(KonTraG), v. 27.04.1998 (BGBI. I S.786). Draft federal legislation and the latest
improvements are reprinted in 18 ZErITsCHRIET FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (ZIP) 2059
(1997); 19 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR WIRTSCHAFrSRECHtT (ZIP) 487 (1998).
113. See Raiser, Einflu3 der Kreditinstitute, supra note 95, at 2262.
114. See Theodor Baums & Philipp von Randow, Der Markt fir
Stimmrechtsuertreter, 40 DIE ARINGESELLSCHAFT 145, 156 (1995).
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tutes a new interest group (the auditors) for an old one (the
banks). To be sure, the auditors would not have a stake in the
corporation, but even without comparable equity holdings they
would exercise a remarkable voting power without risk. To this
power adds the suggestion that the auditors may exercise prox-
ies even for those shareholders who have not given their au-
thorization beforehand, and then do not show up at the meet-
ing. It is highly doubtful whether this penalty-like solution to
shareholder passivity ("if you do not vote your share, someone
else will") adequately alerts shareholders to the necessity of
voting or giving the express authorization to proxy holders.
Both legal history and "rational" shareholder conduct indicate
otherwise."5 "Automated" authorization is at odds with the
accountability of agents, in particular of those who act on be-
half of large, non-homogeneous and a mainly silent group of
principals. The lack of a sufficient monitoring scheme (feed-
back) may even result in an exacerbation of skewed incentives
as compared to the banks. That is, an individual (auditor)
somehow seems more receptive to influence by dishonest man-
agement than to a bank with a stake in the company. At the
same time, the number of five auditors, instead of 30 to 50
banks in one annual meeting, suggests less plurality and ex-
pertise deficiencies. Given the fact that the auditors are com-
plete outsiders to the corporation, it is furthermore doubtful
that they could gather as much information as the banks in
order to make their recommendations on how to vote. To im-
plement such a vague alternative does not seem worth the
high transition costs it would cause."1
115. If the promotion of the capital markets is taken seriously, it is imperative
to accept that small shareholders may regard their shares simply as some kind of
investment instead of forcing them by law to act like responsive owners of the
corporation; See Weotermann, supra note 16, at 273. Presently, there are many
discussions about the necessity to deregulate the rather firm German Stock Cor-
poration Act. In this light, creating new constraints seems to send the wrong sig-
nal. As stated above, it is essential that shareholders who diversify their risks in
their portfolios may simply regard their shares as investment devices.
116. See Lutter, Macht der Banken, supra note 89, at 2767; Raiser, Einflu3 der
Kreditinstitute, supra note 95, at 2262. It should be noted that in a pending suit a
shareholder protection group (Deutsche Schutzgemeinschaft der Kleinaktiontire) de-
mands that Deutsche Telekom refrain from hiring auditing companies for the pur-
pose of exercising proxy votes in future shareholder meetings. Prior to its first
annual meeting in 1997, the managing board of Deutsche Telekom asked small
shareholders to give their proxies to Price Waterhouse, which later in fact exer-
cised about 6 million votes. The plaintiff alleges that contrary to prior announce-
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b. Limitation of Firm Ownership by Banks?
Other suggestions did not touch the legal framework of
proxy voting, but rather addressed the potential for conflicts of
interest of banks. Among those was the proposal to reduce the
maximum percentage of firm ownership by one bank to 5%.117
However, notwithstanding the relatively liberal provisions of
the German Banking Act (Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen) as to
direct stock holdings by banks,"' the banks themselves have
exercised a kind of self-discipline and overwhelmingly do not
exceed this proposed ceiling anyway."' The impressive hold-
ings of some large German banks are rather exceptional, and
do not blur the impression that banks carefully diversify risk
in their portfolios, and a much greater voting power accrues to
them from the exercise of proxies. Therefore, this proposal
would not change much with respect to conflict-of-interest
problems, but could be a signal for more confidence in the pres-
ent system.2 ' On the other hand, such limits are to be evalu-
ment, Price Waterhouse was not a neutral and independent trustee, but received a
fee of about DM 250,000 from the corporation. Furthermore, it is asserted that
Price Waterhouse was contractually obligated to vote in accordance with
managements proposals, provided the shareholders had not given instructions on
the exercise of their voting rights. See Die Schutzgemeinschaft der Kleinaktiondre
verklagt die Telekom, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Oct. 7, 1997, at 21.
117. There is dispute on where to draw the line. See Hopt, Inside Information,
supra note 99, at 238. See also Lutter, Macht der Banken, supra note 89, at 2767
(suggesting that a bank should not hold more than 10% of a single corporation's
outstanding stock. This is the percentage suggested in the Second European Bank
Supervision Law Harmonization Directive).
118. Under the provisions of the Banking Act, the total book value of a bank's
investments in shares (real estate, ships etc.) may not exceed its capital and re-
serves. See Gesetz fiber das Kreditwesen [Banking Act], v. 11.07.1985 (BGB1. I
S.1472). See also Immenga, supra note 86, at 30 (providing more information
about the Banking Act).
119. Of Germany's 500 biggest companies, there are only about 30 in which
banks hold stock of more than 10%. See Schneider-Lenn6, supra note 100, at 288-
89. On the other hand, the companies with remarkable bank-holdings are among
Germany's largest.
120. With respect to the existing large blocks, it would be necessary, however,
to allow a long period of transition in order to prevent a market depression trig-
gered by an immediate sale of large amounts of shares. A total ban of non-bank
holdings of banks would clearly run counter to the trend which has some influence
on other countries. For example, American academics currently look upon direct
holdings as a desirable financial investment for banks, helping to stabilize their
profit base by way of asset diversification. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examina-
tion of Germany, Japan, and the United States, 48 STAN. L. REV. 73, 110 (1995)
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ated cautiously, since the corresponding restriction of entrepre-
neurial freedom for banks may be easily deemed discriminato-
ry under constitutional law.
121
A somewhat similar approach is now taken by sentence 3
in AktG section 135, par. 1 ("KonTraG").2 2 It provides that
banks with direct or indirect ownership of 5% and above in one
single firm are obligated to vote either their own stock or the
proxies. Through this method, smooth but firm pressure is put
on banks to reduce their firm ownership. However, it seems
arbitrary that everything seems to be fine at 4.9% of stock in
the firm, while holdings of 5% and above are deemed a prob-
lem. Considering the above mentioned self-discipline as re-
gards investments, this suggestion hardly helps to solve con-
flicts of interest. Rather, it is the "collective action" of banks
when voting as proxy holders that is feared, rather than the
influence of one single bank. Also, the implied assertion that
banks dispose of their own shares to exercise the power with-
out risk provided by the proxies is highly speculative: Banks
may decide differently: They keep their own stock but vote the
proxies, thus keeping their influence with a minor reduction.
Otherwise, given shareholders' inertia, the average attendance
at annual meetings may be reduced significantly, if no one is
ready to step in."
[hereinafter Macey & Miller, Corporate Governance]. Also, due to the financial
expertise of banks, it does not make sense to stop their employees from sitting on
the supervisory board of industrial companies. The proposed compromise to reduce
the number of seats a single person can have on supervisory boards of different
companies does not eliminate any possible conflict of interest. Rather it would
improve the efficiency of the supervisory board itself.
121. See Peter 0. Miilbert, Empfehlen sich gesetzliche Regelungen zur
Einschriinkung des Einflusses von Kreditinstituen auf Aktiengesellschaften, 49 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENScHRIFT, BEILAGE ZUM 23. HEFT, 24, 27 (1996); Uwe H.
Schneider & Ulrich Burgard, Transparenz als Instrument der Steuerung des
Einflusses der Kreditinstitute auf Aktiengesellschaften, 49 DER BETRIEB 1761 (1996)
[hereinafter Schneider & Burgard, Transparenz].
122. See Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich
(KonTraG), v. 27.04.1998 (BGB1. I S.786) (citing AktG § 135(1), as amended).
123. See Hammen, Vollmachtsstimmrecht, supra note 70, at 1227; Friedrich
Kiibler, Empfehlen sich gesetzliche Regelungen zur Einschrinkung des Einflusses
der Kreditinstitute auf Aktiengesellschaften?, in VERHANDLUNGEN DES
EINUNDSECHZIGSTEN DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAGES 13 n.11, 14 n.20 (1996) [hereinafter
Kilbler, Referat].
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c. Increasing Influence of Shareholder Associations and
Institutional Investors?
Another modification to the present system can be referred
to as a "market solution," because it leads to a market for
proxy holders. Stated differently, in the future the banks
should face competition by shareholders' protective associa-
tions, institutional investors, and self-employed persons, such
as the above-mentioned auditors. Partly, this again is not a
new legal approach, since the 1965 Stock Corporation Act al-
ready provides a provision which lays down that the sections
ruling the exercise of proxies by banks will apply, mutatis
mutandis to the exercise of the voting rights by shareholders'
protective associations and persons who professionally solicit
from shareholders the exercise of the voting rights at annual
meetings. Rather, this idea tries to signal psychological sup-
port for greater activity by proxy holders (other than banks),
than amend the present system legally.
Theoretically, in particular, shareholders' associations
seem to be ideal proxy holders, because they are interested and
responsive by nature, do not suffer from any conflicts of inter-
est, and can concentrate exclusively on the maximization of
share value. However, in hoping that they will play a more
important role soon and concurrently push the banks to a
better performance, supporters do violence to the German
experience of the last thirty years. Less than 1% of the share-
holders in Germany have been represented by those
shareholders' protective associations at annual meetings."
This number is not promising at all. Even if one takes into
account the fact that expert observers noticed a new kind of
shareholder activism and a respectable shareholder protection
association (Deutsche Schutzvereinigung fir Wertpapierbesitz)
which arrived on the German scene in the early nineties, 5
one cannot rely on this. It is hard to tell whether this develop-
ment is going to wane, or whether it is just the first step in a
new era. It requires much from the shareholders, because the
124. See K~ndgen, Duties of Banks in Voting Their Clients' Stock, supra note
53, at 541.
125. See Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A
Comparative Perspective, 57 BROO. L. REv. 1, 21 & n.78 (1991) [hereinafter
Buxbaum, Institutional Owners].
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majority of them still have to overcome long-lasting inertia.
Undoubtedly a positive development, shareholders' activism
needs strong leverage to be put into life. For the reasons stated
above, one may express doubts as to whether there really is a
market for proxy voting.26 As discussed above, in an econo-
my preferring the bearer share, the depositing banks are im-
portant intermediaries which have access to the body of share-
holders, and therefore facilitate communication between a
corporation and its shareholders. They hold a strategic posi-
tion. In order to promote more active shareholders' associa-
tions, banks, similar to the brokers in the United States,
should become legally obligated to send shareholder name lists
to those associations, in order to enable them to communicate
not only with shareholders who are already members, but also
with shareholders who are not yet organized. According to the
recently-amended AktG, 27 it is now mandatory for banks to
inform their clients about alternative proxy holders.'28 Con-
currently, in the obligatory announcement and communication
prior to an annual meeting,'29 the corporation itself must
highlight the possibility of voting rights being exercised by
shareholders' associations. However, the reform failed to take a
further step. Ideally, the section would obligate the corporation
to inform shareholders' associations about the agenda, no mat-
ter whether they voted rights for shareholders at the last
meeting or not. In this case, the scope of information should be
extended materially as well, since the shareholders' associa-
tions cannot have as much inside information as banks do.
Finally, this leads to the fact that the shareholders' associa-
tions must hire experts who are able to digest and evaluate the
information given, to observe the markets, etc. They cannot do
so without money, which has to be collected through member-
ship fees, or, through payment by the corporation itself (which
is more sound since it prevents free rider problems). In either
case there is no further change without high transaction costs
and increasing expenses for both shareholders and corpora-
126. See Westermann, supra note 96, at 274; Hopt, Corporate Governance, su-
pra note 96, at 259.
127. See AktG § 135(2) (as amended by KonTraG).
128. Compare Lutter, Macht der Banken, supra note 89, at 2767, and AktG §
135(2), with Hammen, Vollmachtsstimmrecht, supra note 70, at 1222, and Kitbler,
Referat, supra note 123, at 15 n.21.
129. See AktG § 125(1).
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tions. Today one cannot say whether all this creates enough
incentive for more active shareholders and shareholders' asso-
ciations.
It is equally debatable whether non-bank institutional
investors, as now has been proposed, can become a more re-
sponsive and interested "outside manager." Compared to their
American counterparts, they are not as large yet, and are
mainly bank-influenced.' This, of course (discussed infra),
seems to change all over Europe. German insurance companies
could play an important role but they have not detected their
potential for stock investments yet.' However, experience in
the United States has proven that institutional shareholders
until recently have been predominantly passive. 2 According
to their growing size they are now regarded increasingly as an
independent supervisor, and they themselves are (slowly) be-
ginning to accept and practice the idea that voting is impor-
tant.3 ' Legal scholars have been strongly advocating in order
to motivate them to exercise their voting power with the vigor
of German banks.'34 Again, this suggests that at least some
interest to monitor on the proxy holder's side is desirable in
order to make them fulfill their function. Given those similar
ingredients, the institutional investor is not on its face the
preferable proxy holder compared to a bank.' On the con-
130. See Friedrich K. Kibler, Institutional Owners And Corporate Managers: A
German Dilemma, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 97, 98-100 (1991) [hereinafter Kfibler, Ger-
man Dilemma]; Westermann, supra note 16, at 270.
131. According to their individual investment philosophies, life insurance compa-
nies invest their money in the markets, however not more than 10% in equities.
See Michael Hauck, The Equity Market and its Dependency on the System of Old
Age Provisions, in INSTrrONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 555, 558
(Theodor Baums et al. eds., 1994).
132. See Alfred F. Conard, The European Alternative to Uniformity in Corpo-
ration Laws, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2150, 2198 (1991); CARY & EISENBERG, CORPORA-
TIONS, supra note 21, at 245-46 (stating that "there seems to have been a club
culture shared by many institutional investors, under which voting against man-
agement 'wasn't done"). In Germany, it seems that even most of the institutional
investors have given proxies to the banks. See Westermann, supra note 16, at 274.
133. For a more in-depth background of this shift, see CARY & EISENBERG,
supra note 21, at 248; Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 33; Edward B. Rock, The
Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO.
L.J. 445 (1991).
134. See Conard, supra note 132, at 2198. See also CARY & EISENBERG, supra
note 21, at 246-48 (considering the legal requirement that U.S. pension funds
actively vote their shares).
135. See Buxbaum, Institutional Owners, supra note 125, at 36 (suggesting
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trary, once again the question arises, whether and to what
extent monitoring or even proxy holding by large institutional
investors with own business or equity interests in the firm is
favorable or detrimental to the small, dispersed investors."6
Thus, the task in German corporate governance cannot be to
replace one self-interested proxy holder with another who may
be only slightly less self-interested, but to impose more sophis-
ticated or to elaborate duties to the proxy holders, no matter if
they are banks or non-bank institutional investors.
4. The Elaboration of Proxy Holders' Duties
a. Disclosure and Compliance
Since the success of the supplement by shareholder associ-
ations is rather uncertain, and other modifying proposals that
tried to cut out some of the conflict-of-interest situations banks
have to face were rejected, it seems necessary to further en-
hance the present tight proxy mechanism. Stated differently,
the current myriad of proposals and amendments should not
distract the lawyers from the real issue of how best to disci-
pline an agent. As previously indicated, the performance of
banks in the proxy process happens in a classical agency set-
ting. Agents (banks) are watching agents (management). The
law itself affirms that the bank has to act in the shareholder's
best interest-that the relationship is a fiduciary one. 1' The
question is how to control (not to say to tame), a quite power-
ful agent, and how to prevent him from being tempted by cer-
tain enticements that occur along the way. At the end of the
road, there should be an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the
shareholders that is still exercised in light of what is best from
a long-term perspective.'38
some kind of interchangeability in "the German version of the institutional inves-
tor is the universal bank."); Schneider & Burgard, Transparenz, supra note 121, at
1761 (criticizing that the discussion about undue influence on German corporations
is limited to banks).
136. See Baums, Takeovers, supra note 69, at 180; Grossfeld, supra note 102,
at 101.
137. See AktG § 128(2).
138. It may be a good idea to further stress this by making the exercise of
proxy voting into a financial service, which the bank is fully compensated for via
corporate funds. See K6ndgen, Duties of Banks in Voting Their Clients' Stock, su.
pra note 53, at 537 (outlining the recent Swiss practice). As discussed above,
shareholders' associations will also require more expenses. If the money is not
530 [Vol. =X-V2
19981 GERMAN SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION 531
As the American experience suggests, the key to this duty
of loyalty and duty of care and "structural implementation of
shareholder democracy""9 is "full disclosure." Disclosure has
a longstanding tradition in the United States and can be easily
extended in the German Corporation Act without violating a
deep-rooted corporate tradition. It is just a small step, since
the present provisions, as indicated, are already American-
influenced. Hence, in their proxy statements banks not only
should disclose their employees who sit on the supervisory
board of the corporation, their membership in underwriting
groups, and their relevant stock holdings, 4 ' but also their
credit arrangements and other stakes in the firm which might
influence their proposals.' Also, special circumstances in the
firm, such as severe financial distress, may trigger special in-
terests of banks and therefore require disclosure. However
debatable the proper scope of information to be provided, it
seems a common view among scholars that enhanced transpar-
ency is desirable.' Certainly, it seems imperative that the
taken directly out of the small shareholder's pocket, this will not affect the
shareholder's voting conduct. Id.
139. For an explanation of this term, see Richard M. Buxbaum, Comparative
Aspects of Institutional Investment and Corporate Governance, in INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3, 4 (Theodor Baums et al. eds., 1994)
[hereinafter Buxbaum, Institutional Investors].
140. See AktG §§ 128(2), sent. 6, amended by Gesetz zur Kontrolle und
Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG), v. 27.04.1998 (BGB1. I S.786).
See also Schneider & Burgard, Transparenz, supra note 121, at 1763-1765 (arguing
that it is imperative that existing disclosure obligations be harmonized to avoid
loopholes and practical problems from the array of different information require-
ments). See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (WpHG), v. 26.07.1994 (BGB1. I S.786) § 21.
141. See Schneider & Burgard, Transparenz, supra note 121, at 1765 (suggest-
ing an amendment to WpHG § 22(1) to include in the disclosure obligation the
number of voting rights to be exercised at the annual meeting without specific
instructions given by the shareholders alongside the major investments and
disinvestments in the stock of a listed company). As they point out, such numbers
are subject to permanent change, and should therefore be delivered shortly before
the annual meeting. Id. However, despite the significant costs of such procedure,
this kind of information does not seem to weed out the major concerns. As op-
posed to the other pieces of information to be provided in the future, it is leverage
for pursuing its own interests but a source of the classical conflicts of interests.
Rather it seems urgent to discuss the abolishment of shareholder anonymity in
German corporate law. See AktG § 129(2) (list of participants present at the annu-
al meeting). "The names of the shareholders who have granted the proxies need
not be mentioned." Id. In part, this anonymity has led to the discussion about the
"power of banks," since an agent without a personified principal does not seem to
be required to account for his conduct.
142. See Mflbert, supra note 121, at 28; Schneider & Burgard, Transparenz,
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amount of disclosed information be carefully determined. The
ability and willingness to absorb information decreases as its
amount increases.
At any rate, it would not be a big hurdle if the banks were
obligated to give material reasons for their proposals in writing
to acquaint the shareholders with what is going on.'" This
would lead to a more informed shareholder, and possibly deter
the bank from secretly weighing its own possible gain against
the interest of its principal.
In addition, the latter problem should be addressed by the
implementation of another well-established American rule:
Disclose or abstain. While developed for insider trading, the
rule can be easily transferred to the proxy context: A bank that
is not willing or able to give the above-required information
(i.e. to disclose) must abstain from exercising proxy votes.4 '
For example, it may be constrained as a matter of law'46 to
refuse to provide information to the extent that providing such
information is, according to sound business judgment, likely to
cause material damage to the corporation or an affiliated en-
terprise. Therefore, a bank that faces a current conflict of in-
terest deriving from a certain business arrangement should be
excluded from exercising proxies. 4 7 To avoid a significant
drop in shareholder participation at an annual meeting, the
abstaining bank should be obligated to transfer all files to
other banks or shareholder associations who are willing to step
in and exercise the proxies.
supra note 121, at 1762.
143. See Hammen, Vollmachtsstimmrecht, supra note 70, at 1223.
144. See Lutter, Macht der Banken, supra note 89, at 2767. It is noteworthy
that German corporations offer much less insight into their financial substance
than, for example, American enterprises. See Klaus J. Hopt, European Takeover
Regulation: Barriers to and Problems of Harmonizing Takeover Law in the Europe-
an Community, in EUROPEAN TAKEoVERS 165, 170 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy
Wymeersch eds., 1992) [hereinafter Hopt, Takeover Law in the EC].
145. See Hopt, Inside Information, supra note 99, at 240; K6ndgen, supra note
53, at 552. See also Miilbert, supra note 121, at 28 (suggesting that a bank should
refrain from delivering a proposal if members of its personnel or those of its sub-
sidiaries are to be elected). But see CLAUS WILHELM CANARIS, BANKVERTRAGSRECHT
1103, n.2187 (2d ed., 1981) (arguing against broader disclosure).
146. See, e.g., the rationale of AktG § 131(3).
147. See Miilbert, supra note 121, at 28. See also AktG § 136(1) (providing that
[n]o person may exercise voting rights on his own behalf or on behalf of any
other person in respect of a resolution concerning ratification of his acts, his dis-
charge from liability, or enforcement by the company of a claim against him").
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Finally, another legal device that seems to be en vogue in
banking law may weaken conflict of interest issues: Compli-
ance. That is to say, if we realistically can reduce universal
banks' influence on corporate affairs only to a certain degree,
mandatory rules should be drafted that require banks to struc-
ture their internal organisation and division of business fields
(such as underwriting, commercial loans, equity investments,
securities trading and deposing) so that they may not exert
undue influence on each other. A sophisticated compliance code
("conduct of business regulation and self-control") therefore is
expected not only to enhance banks' performance in proxy
voting, but also to dampen the somewhat irrational criticism of
"depository voting," even in cases in which a supposedly slack
performance of a bank employee on the supervisory board of
the corporation was the sole reason for not having stopped bad
corporate decisions. Also, this internal division of powers and
creation of "chinese walls" might create new incentives for the
depository branch to pay attention to shareholders' interests
more intensely. Caring about "shareholder value" is increasing-
ly deemed a competitive advantage among market players of
banking and investment services in Germany. 48 In conclu-
sion, the amendments in the AktG as to compliance de-
serve approval; they are a first step into the right direction.
However, they set up a rather vague frame, thus affording
remarkable leeway for the methods for implementing the re-
quired organizational precautions.
b. Liability of Proxy Holders
Regardless of the amendment of the Stock Corporation
Act, the judicial trend is currently slowly turning to examine
the duties of proxy holders more closely.' First, it seems
natural to further investigate the private cause of action held
by those shareholders for which the proxy holder was an agent.
This is well-established on the grounds of breach of con-
148. See Schneider & Burgard, Transparenz, supra note 121, at 1762.
149. See AktG § 128(2), amended by Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im
Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG), v. 27.04.1998 (BGB1. I S.786).
150. See, e.g., Horst Hammen, Zur Haftung bei der Stimmrechtsvertretung
durch Kreditinstitute in der Hauptversammlung der Aktiengesellschaft, 5
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR BANKRECHT UND BANKWIRTSCHAFT 239 (1993) [hereinafter
Hammen, Haftung bei der Stimmrechtsvertretung].
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tract 5' but courts so far have not had a chance to lay out
firm principles regarding the violation of the duties of a proxy
holder. According to the AktG, the liability may not be waived
or limited. 15 2 In addition, the shareholders may have a tort
claim under BGB section 823(2), which covers the infringement
of the "protective provisions" of AktG sections 128 and 135 by
the proxy holder.'53
More importantly, in a recent judgment ("Girmes-
Entscheidung")'" the Bundesgerichtshof (Private Law Su-
preme Court) held a self-interested acting proxy holder liable
for the damages caused to the corporation, or to those share-
holders he had not represented at the annual meeting. 5 The
proxy holder had refused to assent to the financial reorganiza-
tion of the Girmes AG by way of capital reduction. Shortly
after, the corporation had to file for bankruptcy. A shareholder
filed a law suit against the proxy holder to compensate the loss
on his shares. The Court held for the plaintiff and remanded
the case for further discovery on the facts. The Court did not
decide the case on the grounds of corporate law, but simply
drew an analogy to a well-established rule in agency law' in
order to reach the holding.'57 The underlying rationale is that
151. This is known as positive Vertragsverletzung [des Auftrages, BGB § 662].
This doctrine, which is not contained in the Civil Code, was developed by the
courts soon after the BGB came into effect to cover breach of contract other than
delay and impossibility of performance, including default in performance or insuffi-
cient performance. See Ingeborg Schwenzer, The Law of Contracts, in INTRODUC-
TION TO GERMAN LAW 173, 182 (Werner F. Ebke & Matthew W. Finkin eds.,
1996).
152. See AktG § 135(11).
153. Under the provision of the BGB, a person who infringes a statutory provi-
sion intended for the protection of others (Schutzgesetz) is liable for any damage
arising from the infringement. See Klaus Vieweg, The Law of Torts, in INTRODUC-
TION TO GERMAN LAW 197, 209 (Werner F. Ebke & Matthew W. Finkin eds.,
1996). See also von Falkenhausen, supra note 48, at 77 (pointing out that the pro-
visions of §§ 128 and 135 AktG have been designed to protect shareholders).
154. See Judgment of Mar. 20, 1995, Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], available in 50
JURISTENZEITUNG 1064 (1995). This judgment has been widely recognized as a
landmark case because the Court imposed fiduciary duties (Treuepflichten) to mi-
nority shareholders which are owed to their fellow shareholders. See Marcus
Lutter, Das Girmes-Urteil, 50 JURISTENZEITUNG 1053, 1056 (1995) [hereinafter
Lutter, Girmes-Urteil].
155. Ironically, the defendant in the case was not a powerful proxy holder on
its face but a kind of "self-appointed knight" who solicited proxies in order to fight
the "greedy banks" on behalf of the small shareholders.
156. BGB § 179(1).
157. See Bundesgerichtshof, supra note 154, at 1067-1068. Compare BGB §
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an agent who does not disclose the identity of the principal to
a third party (and therefore makes it impossible for the third
party to sue the principal), can be held liable. This is an excep-
tion to the general rule, which states that only the principal is
liable for damage caused by the agent.5 ' Also, the Court con-
cluded that a liability of the proxy holder may be based on
BGB section 826, which provides that "a person who wilfully
causes damage to another in a manner contrary to public poli-
cy is bound to compensate the other for the damage."
Unfortunately, the question before the Court was not
whether the same principles apply to a factual background in
which a bank exercises the proxies of many small, uninformed
shareholders who must rely on the bank's possibly misleading
proposal. What might happen in this scenario if the exercise of
the voting rights caused damage to the corporation and the
bank decided to disclose the names of the shareholders? Share-
holders might be sued by their fellow shareholders (or the
corporation), although the failure is clearly on the shoulders of
the superior bank. The liability of shareholders would definite-
ly deter others from investing in equity, even if we only consid-
er the possible scope of damages. In this case, where an "insti-
tutional proxy holder"' 59 acts more or less independently, and
is hardly controllable by a single shareholder, the shareholders
themselves must be protected: The proxy holder should be the
only one who is sued. To achieve this, it is not necessary to
impose corporate duties of loyalty (Treupflichten)60 (owed by
shareholders regardless of their "controlling minority" or ma-
jority) on the bank because it has aggregated proxy voting
power. It is sufficient to subject the bank to another well-es-
tablished rule of German agency law: the notion of a self-inter-
ested agent who "plays the boss."'6' Admittedly, this requires
179(1), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 322 ("Principal Undisclosed"
provides .[w]hoever has entered into a contract as agent is, if he has not given
proof of his authority, bound to the other party at his choice either to carry out
the contract or to compensate him, if the principal refuses to ratify the contract").
158. See §§ 164(1), 164(3) & 278 Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) [Civil Code].
159. See Lutter, Girrnes-Urteil, supra note 154, at 1056.
160. For the majority view, see Hammen, Haftung bei der
Stimmrechtsvertretung, supra note 150, at 242.
161. See Lutter, Girmes-Urteil, supra note 154, at 1056; KARSTEN SCHM[IDT,
supra note 45, at 861; Joachim Hennrichs, Treuepflichten im Aktienrecht-zugleich
Uberlegungen zur Konkretisierung der Generalklausel des § 242 BGB sowie zur
Eigenhaftung des Stimmrechtsvertreters, 195 ARCHlV FOR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS
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that the prerequisites for such liability can be extended, as
carved out by case law. So far, only an agent who has some
economic interest in closing the deal, or who induces additional
firm reliance regarding the correctness of his or her state-
ments, may be subjected to personal liability."2 However, it
also seems plausible that an agent with 'immaterial interest'
may be held liable. Thus, the bank itself becomes a "quasi
shareholder" with the inherent duties. This notion of the self-
interested agent would give fellow shareholders who are not
clients of the damage-causing proxy holder an efficient, tort-
like private cause of action..
However promising and far-reaching all this may sound, it
is not firmly grounded in German law. In the Girmes judg-
ment, the Bundesgerichtshof explicitly declined to rely on the
doctrine of the self-interested agent. Also, the judgment of
Oberlandesgericht Diisseldorl" (district court of appeals), the
court to which the case was remanded, reveals that the holding
of the Bundesgerichtshofs judgment is narrow and under-inclu-
sive: Both BGB section 179 paragraph 1, and section 826 re-
quire "intent" (Vorsatz) as a precondition to liability. As a gen-
eral rule, intent implies awareness of the violation of the duty
(Bewu/ltsein von der Pflichtwidrigkeit), thus providing the
proxy holder with a powerful defense. This presents a thresh-
old that is possibly too high to ever hold a proxy holder liable.
It may be true that in a classical arms-length principal-
agent relationship, the general rule in BGB section 164 para-
graph 1 is followed. However, it should be recognized that this
constellation is not comparable to the bank-shareholder rela-
tion in which the agent benefits from the advantage of "asym-
metric information:" The small shareholder's inferior knowl-
edge compels him to rely entirely on the bank.'
222, 262-67 (1995).
162. For a comprehensive discussion see Hennrichs, supra note 161, at 266;
Joachim Hennrichs, ENTSCHEIDUNGSSAMMLUNG ZUM WIRTScHAFTs- UND BANKRECHT
(WuB) II A. § 135 AktG 1.95. But see Bundesgerichtshof, supra note 154, at 1072;
Hammen, Haftung bei der Stimmrechtsvertretung, supra note 150, at 244; Markus
Brender, ENTSCHEIDtUNGSSAMMLUNG ZUM WIRTSCHAFTS- UND BANKRECHT (WuB) II
A. § 135 AktG 1.94.
163. Oberlandesgericht Dfisseldorf, judgment of June 14, 1996, reprinted in 49
WERTPAPIERMrTEILUNGEN 1366 (1996). For a critical review, see Joachim
Hennrichs, ENTSCHEIDUNGSSAMMLUNG ZUM WiTSCHAFrS- UND BANKRECHT (WuB) II
A § 135 AktG 1.95.
164. See K6ndgen, Duties of Banks in Voting Their Clients' Stock, supra note
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In sum, despite those remaining problems, the judgment of
the Bundesgerichtshof has opened a new door to the issue of
liability of proxy holders. The development is not yet conclud-
ed. It seems not beyond contemplation that this trend might
eventually spread to other grounds of liability. All of this rais-
es other, rather complex questions concerning burdens of proof,
and of the correct assertion of damages.'65 However, if it is
further pursued, it hopefully will (together with the proposed
enlarged disclosure requirements), elaborate the duty of loyal-
ty, police the banks' performance and restore reliance to the
present system.
D. Other Legal and Economic Pressures for Reforming or
Supplementing the German Proxy System
1. The European Perspective
After having examined the proxy system in Germany, and
having tried to suggest some modification, another problem
remains to be discussed. We do not address the question of
whether the present system should be changed because of its
weakness, but rather whether it has to change, in order to
respond to outside legal or economic pressure.
At the outset, one of the forces that push different proxy
systems toward convergence may be the increased law-making
output of the European Community (EC). Here, one may as-
sume, competing systems such as the depository voting in
Germany, or the American-like proxy voting in England (both
are not perfect) will merge and create a third alternative.
As a matter of fact, quite the opposite seems to be occur-
ring. The European Company Law is presently not among the
high priorities or first class legislative plans, even though
there are 13 Directives dealing with this subject. 66 Over the
last 20 years the EC has published those "proposals" focussing
53, at 547.
165. See Bundesgerichtshof, supra note 154, at 1065. As to the Court, the de-
cline of the stock market price may be a factor to assert the damages.
166. Also, there is a proposal to create a European Corporation ("societas
europaea") which is not supposed to substitute but to supplement the national
corporation laws of the Member States. Like the European Economic Interest
Group (EEIG), it is believed to facilitate cross-border incorporations and mergers.
However, after twenty years of discussions it seems naive to expect a major re-
form to result from this. See KARSTEN SCHMIDT, supra note 45, at 38.
537
BROOK. J. INTL L.
primarily on stock corporations and limited liability companies.
However, most of them seem to be nothing but rough guide-
lines for harmonization. Only the Fourth67 and Seventh 6 '
Directives (the so-called financial statement directive and the
directive on public disclosure of consolidated accounts) had
significant impact.' The Fifth Directive 7 ° reflects the vari-
ety of different corporate governance systems in the European
countries, rather than pushes the Member States of the Com-
munity into one certain direction. Certainly, a directive that
enables the Member States to choose among six different cor-
porate governance systems (out of which two could exist in
parallel fashion under the transformed national law) is not a
strong and carefully thought out model that calls for harmoni-
zation of laws.' 7 ' However, given the development in other
fields of European law (e.g., banking regulation and supervi-
sion), the influence of the directive should not be underestimat-
ed. For our discussion, the following should be observed: Even
though the proposed model recognizes proxy voting by manage-
ment, 7 ' the model seems to favor proxy voting by profession-
al intermediaries holding themselves out for just this type of
financial service.'73 From a German perspective, it would not
make sense to simply replace a proxy system with conflict-of-
interest issues, only to implement another with even more
severe problems of the same type that demand high adminis-
trative (and costly) efforts to correct fiduciary abuses. 74 The
167. See Council Directive No. 78/660 O.J. (L 222) 11 (1978) (on the annual
accounts of companies).
168. See Council Directive No. 83/349 26 O.J. (L 193) 1 (1983) (on consolidated
accounts of companies).
169. Uwe H. Schneider, The Development of European Private Law and its
Relationship to Domestic Systems of Law, 10 BANKING & FINANCE L. REV. 301,
324 (1995). For more on these directives, see MARCUS LUTrER, EURoP AiscHES
UNTERNEHMENSRECHT 40, 53 (1991).
170. See Amended Proposal for a Fifth Council Directive based on Art. 54 of the
EEC Treaty, in 2 EUROPEAN COMPANY AND FINANCIAL LAW [EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW: TEXT COLLECTION] 781 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1994)
[hereinafter Amended Fifth].
171. See LuTImR, EUROPAiSCHES UNTERNEHMENSRECHT, supra note 169, at 50.
172. See Amended Fifth, art. 28(2).
173. See K6ndgen, Duties of Banks in Voting Their Clients' Stock, supra note
53, at 535.
174. See Z6llner, Die Ausiibung des Stimmrechts far fremde Aktien, supra note
72, at 605-07; Eike von Hippel, Zur Problematik des Aktionair-Stimmrechts, in IUS
PRIVATUM GENTIUi: FESTSCHRIFT FOR MAX RHEINSTEN, 1081, 1092 (1969).
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decisive factor is that through a committee, directors and offi-
cers can act as proxy holders for the shareholders of their cor-
poration: 75 Under present German law, the rationale of AktG
section 71b and section 71d, which provide that the corporation
may not exercise rights flowing from its own shares, clearly
shows that management is not supposed to have that kind of
influence on voting on corporate affairs. 76
Regarding the procedure and restrictions on conferring
discretionary authority on proxies, the European law appears
to be substantially identical to the German Stock Corporation
Act. 77 Concurrently, European Law is clearly in favor of the
universal banking system which theoretically enables German
banks to maintain their role as influential intermediaries. 78
The Second Banking Directive 7  not only provides for mutual
recognition of banking licenses among European Union Mem-
175. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 29, at 119 (pointing out that the right to
vote is much like that of a citizen's right in a representative democracy). German
scholars argue that if the directors to be elected control the election system, a
system of control by (small) shareholders develops into a means to divest control
from them. This is bound to increase management power and to violate the princi-
ple of "separation of powers." See M6hring, supra note 72, at 135; Bernhard
Grossfeld & Werner Ebke, Probleme der Unternehmensverfassung in
rechtshistorischer und rechtsvergleichender Hinsicht (II und Schlufl), 22 DIE
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 92, 95 (1977) [hereinafter Grossfeld & Ebke,
Unternehmensverfassung]. See also BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 138 (outlin-
ing the American perspective). "The proxy machinery has thus become one of the
principal instruments not by which a stockholder exercises power over the manage-
ment of the enterprise, but by which his power is separated from him." Id. Even
after the implementation of the Securities Acts, this remains to be true to some
degree.
176. See KARSTEN SCHIIIDT, supra note 45, at 862. See also AktG § 136(1)
(considering the rationale of the law). But see FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, supra
note 116 (outlining the dispute over Deutsche Telekom's "trust model").
177. See K6ndgen, Duties of Banks in Voting Their Clients' Stock, supra note
53, at 535. For a closer look at the differences, see Amended Fifth, supra note
170, arts. 27, 28; Wendy N. Munyon, Shareholders' Rights in the Common Market:
A Comparative Study, 9 CORNELL INTL L.J., 191, 219 (1976).
178. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE, CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY
STUDIES, Working Party Report No. 12, 27, iii ("Banks or institutions that keep
shares under custody should be instrumental in this activity."); Hopt, Takeover
Law in the EC, supra note 144, at 169. In the U.S. the "Glass Steagal barrier"
seems to erode slowly. See Buxbaum, Institutional Owners, supra note 125, at 19;
Macey & Miller, Corporate Governance, supra note 120, at 110.
179. See Second Council Directive on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations
and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking-up and Pursuit of the Busi-
ness of Credit Institutions, and Amending Directive No. 77/780/EEC, 89/646 O.J.
(L 386) 1 (1989).
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ber States, but also does not contain restrictions on bank hold-
ings in non-bank firms. Its annex is based on the universal
banking model, since it does not distinguish between commer-
cial and investment banking, and is liberal as to securities
powers."80 In sum, one should not expect too much from Eu-
ropean law regarding a dramatic change of German corporate
law.
2. The Proceeding Economic and Legal Reform in Germany
A convergence of economic, technological and social forces
distorts prevalent conditions, and may make it necessary to
react in legal terms. At present, there is much occurring in
Germany that may influence corporate governance and lead its
legal framework toward a new direction. As elsewhere, the ap-
plication of enhanced computer and communication technolo-
gies has facilitated international competition among financial
centers. Much attention has been given to the globalization of
capital markets, particularly in Germany, since the clear ex-
port orientation of its economy triggers many financial trans-
actions which are international by nature.18' By virtue of this
growing concern on the competitiveness and efficiency of Ger-
man capital markets ("Finanzplatz Deutschland"), a number of
supposedly supporting laws have already been enacted. Broad-
ly speaking, the Financial Market Promotion Act
(Finanzmarktfdrderungsgesetz) intends to promote a develop-
ment of increased quantity, quality and diversity in Germa-
ny.- '82 These laws, which may also encourage foreign investors
to become active in German markets, address the shallowness
of German capital markets. Scholars and practitioners have
realized that, in order to stay competitive in the European (if
not worldwide) markets, a larger number of German compa-
nies should acquire capital in equity, rather than in debt. In
order to fight an evident liquidity problem of smaller German
companies, and to promote more stock listings, another Ger-
180. Gruson & Schneider, supra note 86, at 342.
181. See Rolf Breuer, Foreword, in 5 GERMAN CAPITAL MARKET LAW (Rolf U.
Siebel et al. eds., 1995). It is noteworthy that increasing numbers of German
scholars point out that German corporate law must submit to the realities of the
global capital markets, for example with respect to international accounting stan-
dards. See Sch§.fer, Tagungsbericht, supra note 39, at 137.
182. See Breuer, supra note 181, at v.
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man law, the Small Stock Corporation Act (Kleine
Aktiengesellschaft-Gesetz)... tries to make equity financing
more attractive to small or medium-sized German businesses,
which are traditionally the backbone of the German economy.
It is currently easier for a company to go public through selling
equity shares."8 Most importantly, the minimum par value of
a single share has been reduced from DM 50 to DM 5." Ex-
perts estimate that there are about two thousand companies,
many of them still held by the founding family, which are well-
suited to go public by selling shares.'86 Considering that the
number of stock corporations listed on one of the eight German
Stock Exchanges in 1991 was about 630,87 this would create
a remarkable increase. German lawyers are quite optimistic
that the Aktiengesellschaft as a corporate form will become
increasingly attractive to entrepreneurs, who in the past pre-
ferred the limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit
beschrdnkter Haftung). Since there is also the question of men-
tality, it is uncertain if German companies and investors will
choose this new alternative, which breaks with the prevailing
reluctance to disclose details of one's income or wealth to the
public. However, the first generation of heirs with a great deal
of wealth excessively concentrated in their family founders'
firms may well embark on this course. If this occurs, German
capital markets will become notably deeper. In 1996, we wit-
nessed the formerly state-owned Deutsche Telekom go public.
183. See Gesetz fifr kleine Aktiengesellschaften und zur Deregulierung des
Aktienrechts [Small Stock Corporation Act], v. 02.08.1994 (BGB1. I S.1961).
184. More specifically, the Act deregulates some of the more rigid provisions
concerning formation, shareholders' meetings and employees' codetermination. See
James H. Freis, Jr., An Outsider's Look Into The Regulation Of Insider Trading in
Germany: A Guide To Securities, Banking, And Market Reform in Finanzplatz
Deutschland, 19 B.C. INVL & COMP. L. REv. 1, 105-06 (1996).
185. See AktG § 8(1), as amended 02.08.1994 (BGB1. I S.1967). But see
Assmann et al., supra note 71, at 142 (observing that to date, only few companies
have made use of the possibility either to reduce the nominal value of outstanding
shares to the minimum of DM 5 or to issue new shares with such minimum nom-
inal value).
186. See Freis, supra note 184, at 106-07.
187. See Kilbler, German Dilemma, supra note 130, at 101. The number of
truly public corporations seems to be even smaller. The estimates range from forty
to eighty companies. Id. at 102. At present, the total value of all stock traded at
German stock exchanges is only about 800 billion Deutschmarks. Trading in stock
of the 30 biggest corporations comes to 86% of the turnover at German stock ex-
changes. See Dieter Feddersen et al., Einfiihrung, supra note 11, at 2.
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As never before, a six-month advertising campaign preceding
the issuance of the new shares. The campaign attempted to
promote the shares as "the shares for the people," and to in-
duce as many small investors as possible to buy the shares.
Both the Government and the top echelons of German business
hoped that the Deutsche Telekom offering would be so big and
so successful that it might fundamentally dissuade Germans
from a deep-rooted cultural conviction that shares are too
risky, and create a new Aktienkultur (equity culture).'88 Is-
sues of new shares have been heavily oversubsribed. It is not
beyond contemplation that this might eventually be only the
beginning of a new trend. Other privatization will follow.'89
Also, the development may be slowly strengthened by in-
creased retirement funding through private pension funds.
Right now these funds play a minor role in Germany because
of the very comprehensive social security system. Given the
aging of German society, and the permanent concern of the
financing of social security, it is likely that private retirement
plans will become more important in the future.9 '
It is conceivable that all of this, along with a larger num-
ber of active international investors in German capital mar-
kets, eventually will trigger a new ownership structure. 9'
Even though there is hope for more private-party equity in-
vestment, the "institutionalization and globalization"'92 of eq-
uity investments seems to be determinant. Concurrently, the
188. See Edmund L. Andrews, Eager Germans Drive Up Deutsche Telekom on
Opening Day, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1996, at D5. It is noteworthy that the number
of individual shareholders has declined over the years. Right now only 17% of Ger-
man shares are held by small private investors. See Dieter Feddersen et al.,
Einfaihrung, supra note 11, at 2.
189. In 1997, the German government sold its remaining stake in Lufthansa
AG, in an initial public offering. Government officials also hope to hold public
offerings in the postal service and in the postal bank, and to sell another big
stake in Deutsche Telekom. See N.Y. TIMES, supra note 103, at D5; FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Aug. 2, 1997, at 13; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG,
Sept. 30, 1997, at 17.
190. This seems to be a European trend. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EU-
ROPE, supra note 178, at 29-31; Hauck, supra note 131, at 555.
191. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE, supra note 178, at 34-36 (analyz-
ing the increased activism of institutional investment-oriented shareholders). See
also U.S. Equity Markets and the New York Stock Exchange, 1997 NYSE WORKING
PAPER 29-39 (on file with the authors) (stating that with regard to George
Soflanos, the move into non-U.S. Equity will continue).
192. See Schneider & Burgard, Hauptversammlungsprdisenz, supra note 69, at
789.
[Vol. XXIV:2542
1998] GERMAN SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION
greater investor diversity might break up the intimate German
"relational banking" and distort the conditions for corporate
control in Germany. The corporations might also go to foreign
markets to raise capital, 93 or simply ask foreign banks for
financial services.' 94 Also, large foreign investors might not
give German banks the power to exercise proxy votes for
them. 95 As the performance of the Deutsche Bank suggests,
German banks are aware of these new risks and try hard to
avoid them. The banks seem to have realized that the durabili-
ty (or at least adaptability) of existing bank-industry networks
is at stake and demands a new move.9 6 Beginning with its
acquisition of Morgan Grenfell in 1990, Deutsche Bank has
moved aggressively to establish itself as a global investment
bank.'97 This, of course, is not only an economic issue, but
also a legal corporate governance issue. If German banks loos-
en, or even give up'98 their function as intermediaries in the
proxy process as an economic consequence, there will again be
a danger of decreasing attendance at shareholders' meetings,
and create subsequently random majorities. As stated above,
nobody knows whether shareholder associations or institution-
al investors can fill this gap. The obvious lack of interest in
monitoring demonstrated by foreign institutional investors is a
problem.'99 It is equally likely that regional banks, which are
193. In the nineties, we have experienced a dramatic increase of non-U.S. com-
panies at the NYSE. In 1990 there were 96, but in 1996 there were 290. See
NYSE WORKING PAPER, supra note 191, at 31-32. It was Mercedes Benz AG which
was listed on the New York Stock Exchange in 1993.
194. See Conard, supra note 132, at 2193.
195. The increasing offshore investments by United States institutional inves-
tom, with their new importance and activism in U.S. corporate governance, are
likely to have a significant impact on foreign corporate governance in the long
run. See Fanto, Transformation, supra note 2 (outlining the situation in France).
196. See Buxbaum, Institutional Owners, supra note 125, at 18.
197. See N.Y. TIMES, supra note 103; Schneider-Lenn6, supra note 100, at 302.
198. German bankers have announced that they will not fight curbs on their
control over proxy machinery. They have also stated that after a significant re-
form, a cost-benefit analysis might force them to give up their proxy services. See
Hopt, Corporate Governance, supra note 96, at 259. But see Mark J. Roe, German
'Populism" and the Large Public Corporation, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 187, 198
(1994) (stating that this announcement was simply an attempt "to dampen public
protest" which may lead to American-style legal restrictions on banks). This is
clearly not the case, because despite all discussions, there has never been doubt
cast upon the universal banking system.
199. See Kilbler, German Dilemma, supra note 130, at 105-106; Schneider &
Burgard, Hauptuersammlungsprdsenz, supra note 69, at 789. But see Fanto, Trans-
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generally regarded as more small investor-oriented, might see
their chance and offer voting services with greater vigor, if
more private persons are attracted by equity investment.
In any event, at some point, it may even be possible to
provide for proxy voting by management, regardless of its
apparent disadvantages. Therefore, the tentative lesson that
EC Law might teach is that the different proxy systems should
be considered as supplementary, rather than as mutually ex-
clusive.2 0 As this paper has discussed, they are not very dif-
ferent. Also, both systems have proven to be vital elements in
successful different corporate governance systems, whereas
other proposals seem to be highly theoretical. Whether they
can exist alongside each other within one national corporate
governance system, whether they merge, or if one extirpates
the other, is a question of empiricism: What will the preference
of global market participants be? Only the future will deter-
mine the result of this type of "corporate evolution."
PART II. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF DIRECTORS' DUTIES IN
PUBLICLY-HELD CORPORATIONS UNDER U.S. AND
GERMAN LAW
A. Derivative Shareholder Suits under U.S. Law
As can be seen from the above discussion, the exercise of
voting rights is a necessary, yet insufficient feature of share-
holder participation in corporate decisionmaking. It sets princi-
ples for fundamental corporate affairs, rather than immediate-
ly solving current agency problems. This is where (derivative)
shareholder litigation steps in.
The stark separation between shareholders and manage-
ment has resulted in an enormous number of shareholder suits
in the United States. As one way of aligning managers' incen-
tives with shareholders' interests, American law, since at least
the middle of the 19th century, has permitted shareholders to
sue to redress the- damages caused by managerial misbehavior.
formation, supra note 2, at 3 (stating that it is too costly for institutional inves-
tors to always use the "Wall Street Rule" of selling their significant stakes if they
are discontented with management).
200. See Baums, Takeovers, supra note 69, at 183.
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1. Management's Fiduciary Obligations
Shareholders of large, publicly-held companies must inevi-
tably rely on management to run the company's business. In
carrying out their functions, however, managers act only as
agents of the shareholders. The agency relationship between
shareholders and managers creates strict fiduciary obligations
on the part of management. Two components can be distin-
guished: The duty of care and the duty of loyalty.2 '
Regarding the duty of care, New York corporate law ex-
pressly requires that "[a] director shall perform his duties...
in good faith and with that degree of care which an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would use under similar
circumstances."0 2 In other states, comparable requirements
exist. While it is far from clear exactly what this standard
suggests in a particular situation,0" U.S. courts and scholars
seem to agree that the duty of care primarily places upon man-
agement an obligation to exercise reasonable skill and dili-
gence in monitoring corporate affairs and taking board ac-
tion.20
4
The duty of loyalty, on the other hand, generally requires
managers to maximize investors' wealth rather than their own,
and creates a duty of fair dealing in self-interested transac-
tions. Whenever conflicts of interests arise, the duty of loyalty
requires management not to profit at the corporation's ex-
pense.205 However, almost all states have procedures for
cleansing such transactions through a process of disclosure and
approval by either disinterested directors or shareholders.
Breaches of the duty of loyalty are regarded as more seri-
ous than failure to exercise reasonable care. Hence, different
liability standards exist. In the duty of care context, the busi-
ness judgment rule reflects the nature of profit-maximizing
201. Both duties have in common that the violation of either involves increased
agency costs, economic conflicts of interests, and a reduction of shareholder wealth.
See EAsTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 103.
202. N.Y. BUS. CORP. L. § 717(a) (McKinney 1998).
203. For a thorough analysis, see Richard M. Buxbaum, The Duty of Care and
the Business Judgment Rule in American Law Recent Developments and Current
Problems, in DIE HAFTUNG DER LEITUNGSORGANE VON KAPITALGESELLSCHAFTEN 79-
102 (Karl Kreuzer ed., 1991) [hereinafter Buxbaum, Business Judgment Rule].
204. Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 56 (1991).
205. See Swanson, Corporate Governance, supra note 1, at 436.
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decisionmaking: i.e., it requires the taking of risks."' The
business judgment intends to preserve managerial risk-taking
by presuming managerial diligence and good faith in making
business decisions. In effect, it regularly shields the board from
liability.
2. The Mechanics of Derivative Enforcement
U.S. law allows shareholders to enforce the obligations of
management.0 7 In doing so, however, they can act only on
the corporation's behalf. Because corporate officials owe their
duties of loyalty and care primarily to the corporation as their
contractual partner, and only indirectly to shareholders,0 8 a
lawsuit on the basis of a breach of these duties primarily "be-
longs" to the corporation.2 9 Therefore, a lawsuit generally
can only be brought by those who are the company's agents,
i.e., its managers. However, since the agents might under-
standably be reluctant to sue themselves, shareholders may in
such situations step in to enforce the manager's obligation.210
Because their right to sue only derives from the corporation,
such a lawsuit is called derivative.21'
Because the lawsuit primarily is the corporation's, a share-
holder who intends to commence an action against faulty board
members must first demand that the board of directors initiate
206. See Buxbaum, Business Judgment Rule, supra note 203, at 81.
207. To be sure, under U.S. law shareholders may litigate against any party
against whom the corporation has a legal claim. This article, however, focuses on
suits brought against a corporation's own managers.
208. See FANTO, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AMERICAN AND FRENCH LAW, su-
pra note 27, at 104.
209. See Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 200 (Del. 1991).
210. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534-35 (1970) (making a "valid claim
on which the corporation could have sued" a precondition of a derivative action).
211. See N.Y. BUS. CORP. L. § 626(a) ("Action... in the right of a... corpo-
ration to procure judgment in its favor . . . "). See also Carol B. Swanson, Jug-
gling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops
The Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1339-43 (1993) [hereinafter Swanson, Derivative
Litigation]; Richard M. Buxbaum & Uwe H. Schneider, Die Fortentwicklung der
Aktionirsklage und der Konzernklage im amerikanischen Recht, 11 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
UNTERNEHMENS UND GESELLSCHAFISRECHT 199, 204 (1982). Shareholders may
additionally sue managers directly on the basis of an alleged wrong that effects
their individual capacities. Insofar as they do not have to refer to any harm
caused to the corporation. See 2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Part VII, Remedies 18-20
(1992); RALPH C. FERRARA ET AL., SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION, BESIEGING
THE BOARD, § 1.0212] (1998).
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the necessary proceedings.212 If the directors respond affirma-
tively by deciding to bring the action, a derivative suit is usu-
ally precluded. Generally, however, an affirmative response to
a demand does not occur. The board is likely to be very toler-
ant toward the performance of one of its own members.21
Recognizing the probability of reluctance on the side of the
board, state corporate law under certain circumstances permits
the plaintiff-shareholder to omit such a demand.
According to a recent decision of the New York Court of
Appeals, a demand is considered futile: (1) When either the
board's majority is directly interested in the challenged trans-
action214 or the alleged wrongdoers control a majority of the
directors; (2) When the board members did not adequately
inform themselves about the transaction in question; or (3)
When the challenged transaction was so egregious that it could
not have been the product of sound business judgment.215
However, general declarations of such circumstances do not
suffice. To bypass the board, the plaintiff-shareholder must
present particularized facts that support the alleged misbe-
havior or interest in the transaction.216
Interestingly, the demand requirement (and its futility
under special circumstances) is by no means only a procedural
issue. To the contrary, the "demand excused" situation also has
an impact on the substantive aspect of the lawsuit.2" Any
demand necessarily suggests that the situations of the "de-
mand excused" do not apply. Stated differently, a shareholder-
plaintiff who considers such a demand necessary does not
212. N.Y. BUS. CORP. L. § 626(c) (McKinney 1998). See also CARY &
EISENBERG, supra note 21, at 1034. Besides choosing to go forward with a lawsuit,
the board may decide to use intracorporate remedies to avoid litigation. See
Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216 (Del. 1996).
213. See FANTO, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AMERICAN AND FRENCH LAW, su-
pra note 27, at 116 (noting there is a "natural human tendency to downplay the
misbehavior of one . . .of its members").
214. Directors are self interested in a transaction if they will receive a personal
financial benefit from the transaction not shared by stockholders generally.
215. See Marx v. Akers, 88 N.Y.2d 189, 189-200, 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1040.41
(1996). For a summary of the "reasonable doubt" approach pursued by the Dela-
ware Supreme Court, see Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d, at 1216.
216. See N.Y. BUS. CORP. L. § 626(c) (McKinney 1998).
217. Since the demand requirement is one of the core problems of the deriv-
ative suit in U.S. law, this survey concentrates on some of its main features. Oth-
er aspects, such as the contemporaneous ownership rule or the requirement to
post security for possible defendant expenses are not mentioned any further.
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challenge a transaction in which board members are interest-
ed, but questions an alleged misfeasance by one or a few board
members.218 In failing to allege that the demand is futile, the
shareholder therefore has actually admitted that the board is
not controlled by the wrongdoer. In such cases, after the corpo-
ration has declined to initiate any legal proceeding, the board's
refusal would be protected by the immunizing effect of the
"business judgment rule."219
Unsurprisingly, therefore, shareholders often suggest that
a demand is futile.2 In a situation in which no demand on
the board is necessary, however, a further question arises as to
whether the board may still take control over the initiated
proceedings. Broadly speaking, the answer appears to be as
follows: The board might set up a committee of supposedly
disinterested directors, which, after having investigated the
challenged transaction, would generally recommend not to go
forward with the lawsuit. Controversy has centered on the
scope of judicial review to be applied to such decisions that
terminate derivative suits. Under New York law, this decision
would only be subject to minimal judicial review under the
business judgment rule. 2 Delaware seems to pursue a some-
what less generous approach. According to the highest court in
the state, the corporation holds the burden to establish "the
independence and good faith of the committee and the basis
supporting its conclusion."2 22 Even when the burden is met,
the court may also apply its own business judgment to consider
the conflicting interests. The latter approach is considered to
be favorable because it provides that courts, notwithstanding
the board's decision, may in their own discretion balance the
conflicting interests in allowing the lawsuit to proceed, thereby
ensuring "that the derivative suit has at least some possibility
of a corporate governance impact."2
218. See FANTO, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AMERICAN AND FRENCH LAW, su.
pra note 27, at 108.
219. Id. at 118.
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979). See also
CLARK, supra note 16, at 646 (summarizing the issue).
222. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) (adopting balancing
test for reviewing board committee's decision).
223. FANTo, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AMERICAN AND FRENCH LAW, supra
note 27, at 110.
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Given that the plaintiff-shareholders meet all the require-
ments and win the case, any recovery will be paid to the corpo-
ration, and not to the shareholders prosecuting the lawsuit.2"
However, the corporation is at the same time obliged to pay for
the plaintiff-shareholders' legal expenses.2" Moreover, indem-
nification and insurance provisions in the corporate law, or in
the by-laws of a corporation, regularly cover judgments against
directors, unless they misbehaved intentionally or entered into
self-interested transactions."' On the other hand, if the ac-
tion is unsuccessful, the plaintiffs attorney and not the share-
holder may bear the cost risk. In many cases lawyers are the
driving force behind a lawsuit227 and the shareholder, who
may own only a few shares, serves only as a nominal plaintiff
without any cost risk. Much has been said about the "nuisance
value" of possible "strike suits." It has been argued that be-
cause the real party in interest is the lawyer, there might be
an incentive to settle the lawsuit not for the benefit of the ag-
grieved shareholder but for the lawyer's own enrichment. 8
This observation appears to be supplemented by the fact that
corporation's management might be eager to put the lawsuit
behind it without a finding of liability, thereby possibly allow-
ing the corporation to pay high plaintiff-attorney's fees. 9
However, since the corporation (and, indirectly, its owners the
224. See Buxbaum & Schneider, supra note 211, at 204; FERRARA, supra note
211, § 1.02[2]. On rare occasions, however, the recovery is paid directly to the
shareholders in order to prevent windfall gains by offending shareholders. See
Perlnan v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952
(1955).
225. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 29, at 195 (noting the legal rule).
226. See FANTO, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AMERICAN AND FRENCH LAW, su-
pra note 27, at 126-28; CLARK, supra note 16, at 664-674; Daniel R. Fischel &
Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate
Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 284-85
(1986).
227. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982) ("The real incentive to
bring derivative actions is usually not the hope of return to the corporation but
the hope of handsome fees to be recovered by plaintiffs' counsel."), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1051 (1983); KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 29, at 196.
228. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 29, at 196; Fischel & Bradley, supra
note 226, at 263. But see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs
Attorney Rule in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 78 (1991) (suggesting that
"strike suit litigation is relatively uncommon.")
229. See 2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 211, at 6; FANTO, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN AMERICAN AND FRENCH LAW, supra note 27, at 110.
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shareholders), would have to pay these fees, courts have wide
discretion in reviewing the settlement of a derivative action
and may well consider the probable corporate governance im-
pact of allowing the lawsuit to go forward."'
In light of the enormous procedural complexity and numer-
ous substantive requirements, commentators have doubted the
importance of the derivative suit as a means of assuring
management's performance. However, the decision by the Dela-
ware Supreme Court in Smith v. Van Gorkom"' appears to
be a striking counter-example to this conclusion.
B. Shareholder Suits under German Law23
Despite substantive limitations to the scope of liability
rules and procedural obstacles to enforcement mechanisms,
shareholder suits in the United States are still regularly de-
scribed as one of the most striking and threatening ways that
shareholders are able to monitor and exercise control over
managers."3 In contrast, such shareholder activity has hard-
ly been a common feature of the German corporate landscape.
At first glance, this might be somewhat surprising. This is
because the pertinent language of the German Stock Corpora-
tion Act (Aktiengesetz) suggests, as we will see, that the re-
quirements regarding the directors' duties are at least as strict
as the requirements imposed upon their American colleagues.
1. Germany's Statutory Approach Toward
Managers' Liability
Members of the Vorstand (board of directors or board of
managers) of a German corporation are under an obligation to
carry out their functions "with the care of a diligent and con-
scientious manager." 4 As in the United States, this stan-
230. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. § 626(d) (McKinney 1998).
231. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
232. The following outline is based on the Aktiengesetz of September 6, 1965
(BGB1. I S.1089). Current Amendments through the Gesetz zur Kontrolle und
Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG) of April 27, 1998 (BGBI. I S.786)
will be discussed infra, Parts E & F.
233. For a discussion of some of the "intriguing phenomena" of the shareholder
derivative suite, see CONARD, supra note 24, at 399; FERRARA, supra note 211, §
1.04; Reinier Kraakman et al., When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Inter-
ests?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1733, 1733 (1994).
234. See AktG § 93(1). For this translation, see SCHNEIDER & HEIDENHAIN,
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dard places a burden on management to act in a fiduciary
capacity and undertake activities which are bona fide in the
company's best interest (Unternehmensinteresse). Manage-
ments' fiduciary duties toward the company under German
corporate law are repeatedly referred to as Loyalitdts-und
Treuepflichten." Since the shareholders are the "ultimate
owners" of each corporation, courts and scholars interpret the
somewhat sweeping language of Aktiengesetz section 93 para-
graph 1 as primarily embracing the notion of aggregated
shareholder interest and long-term profit maximization. How-
ever, there is a long-standing debate in Germany about the
strong emphasis on protecting shareholder interest. 6 Some
scholars maintain that corporate officers owe fiduciary duties
not only to shareholders, but also to other constituents, such as
employees."3 Creation and maintenance of "shareholder val-
ue" as the first and foremost goal of management is still a
source of discussion and is not easily explained.
AktG section 93, paragraph 3 enumerates specific actions
supra note 9, at 94.
235. See Willi Joachim, The Liability of Supervisory Board Directors in Germa-
ny, 25 INTL LAW. 41, 56 (1991) (citing further references). Joachim puts into ques-
tion whether the Loyalitits- und Treuepflichten of German managers should be
translated as "fiduciary duties." Despite differences between the concepts of trust
and responsibility under Anglo-Saxon law and the pertinent doctrines under Ger-
man law, for the purposes of this article, Loyalitits- und Treuepflichten may nev-
ertheless be translated as "fiduciary duties."
236. In the U.S., a somewhat similar discussion about broadening the scope of
fiduciary duties has taken place. See Oliver Hart, An Economists View of Fiduciary
Duty, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 299, 303-05 (1995) (indicating a critical economic view-
point).
237. See Klaus J. Hopt, Directors' Duties to Shareholders, Employees and Other
Creditors: A View from the Continent, in COMMERCIAL ASPECTS OF TRUST AND
FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 115, 116 (Ewan McKendrick ed., 1992) [hereinafter Hopt,
Directors' Duties]. To be sure, no scholar has yet maintained that shareholders'
and employees' interests should be put on a par. Under the Amended Proposal for
a Fifth Company Law Directive of 20 November 1991, management is required to
"carry out their functions in the interest of the company, having regard to the
interest of the shareholders and the employees." See Amended Fifth, supra note
170, at 788 (emphasis added). See also EUROPEAN COMPANY AND FINANCIAL LAW,
[EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW TEXT COLLECTION] 781, 788 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy
Wymeersch eds., 1994) (indicating the text); Clark D. Stith, Federalism and Com-
pany Law: A "Race to the Bottom" in the European Community, 79 GEO. L.J. 1581,
1596 (1991) (criticizing the provision as "hopelessly vague"). Due to objections to
other provisions of the Fifth Directive, however, this provision has not been enact-
ed. See Terence L. Blackburn, The Unification of Corporate Laws: The United
States, the European Community and the Race to Laxity, 3 GEO. MASON INDEP. L.
REv. 1, 81 (1994).
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which are regarded as per se violations of managers' obliga-
tions. For example, managers are liable for corporate damages
if they, contrary to the law's provisions, repay capital contribu-
tions to shareholders, issue share certificates before capital is
paid in, or distribute company assets."8 Yet, the standard of
care and loyalty is not confined to the duties that are expressly
spelled out by the Aktiengesetz. The broad wording of section
93 of the AktG, the general clause, is clearly intended to en-
compass duties which are not explicitly mentioned in the stat-
ute. 9 Cheating, personal self-dealing, and the use of corpo-
rate opportunities is (although not .explicitly regulated in the
Aktiengesetz), undoubtedly regarded as a violation of AktG
section 93, paragraph L."0 Besides, the German standard of
loyalty and care remains flexible to a large extent, leaving
room for a closer determination on a case-by-case basis.
Failure to adhere to the standards imposed on the
Vorstand results in managers' liability to the corporation.
Whereas the standards of care and loyalty are objective, sub-
jective elements are taken into account when the individual's
personal liability is determined."' Managers' liability may be
joint or several. While any manager who acted faultily is ini-
tially accountable for all damages, other board members incur
liability if their failure to notice the transaction or to intervene
effectively is a violation of their own fiduciary duty to keep
themselves informed.242 In a proceeding to recover damages
238. See Georg A. Wittuhn, Liability of Corporate Directors, Chapter 8: Germa-
ny, in LIABILITY OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 295, 304-06 (Dennis Campbell & Chris-
tian T. Campbell eds., 1993) (providing a brief analysis). It should be noted that
members of the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) are subject to the same standard
of care. See AktG § 116. However, due to the different scope of activities, there is
some discussion in Germany about whether the distinction should be made. See
Hopt, Directors' Duties, supra note 237, at 116-17. In any event, different liability
standards may only result from the different nature of their duties, rather than
from a different legal concept of liability. See Joachim, supra note 235, at 44.
Accordingly, AktG § 116, the section that deals with Aufsichtsrats' liability, simply
refers to AktG § 93, the section which sets out Vorstands' accountability.
239. See Joachim, supra note 235, at 59.
240. See Joachim, supra note 235, at 53-55 (although he focuses on the
Aufsichtsrat, the author states that similar duties arise as far as the Vorstand is
concerned).
241. See Joachim, supra note 235, at 41, 62; Eckert, supra note 53, at 39 (ob-
serving that "a defense based on subjective grounds such as unfitness or inexperi-
ence has not been successfully employed") (citations omitted).
242. See UWE HOFFER, AKTiENGESETZ 398 n.13 (3d ed. 1997); GONTER HENN,
HANDBUCH DES AKTIENRECHTS 243 (1991).
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for wrongful acts, managers bear the burden of proving adher-
ence to the required standard of conduct.~ And, although
managers are sheltered from liability if they act pursuant to a
valid shareholders' resolution, authorization by the supervisory
board (Aufsichtsrat) does not preclude responsibility.'"
2. Enforcing Liability Under German Corporate
Law Framework
As we have seen, the German Stock Corporation Act, on
its face, sets a considerably high standard of duties, and thus
seems to provide for strong shareholder protection against
board members' wrongdoing. 45 However, statutory regula-
tions designed to establish managerial liability mean little if
no efficient mechanism for their enforcement is available."6
In fact, closer examination reveals great differences between
the way the Aktiengesetz addresses managers' obligations, and
the mechanics the statute provides for their enforcement. Per-
haps the most substantial barrier to shareholder suits in Ger-
many is the doctrinal framework which embraces the statutes'
remedial provisions. 7
The first hurdle placed before the prospective shareholder
plaintiff appears when the principle of the corporation as a
separate entity comes into view. 48 While U.S. corporate law
also adheres to this idea, the German doctrine, different from
the somewhat more pragmatic U.S. approach, applies it literal-
ly without any exception.49 Under the Stock Corporation Act,
the following line of argument evolves: No contractual relation-
ship exists between the managing group and the shareholder
243. See AktG § 93(2).
244. See AktG § 93(4); Steefel & von Falkenhausen, supra note 62, at 530.
245. See Marc von Samson-Himmelstjerna, Persdnliche Haftung der Organe von
Kapitalgesellschaften, 89 ZErrsCHRIFT FOR VERGLEIcHENDE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFFEN
288, 303 (1990) (indicating the similarity of the U.S. and German standards). But
see Steefel & von Falkenhausen, supra note 62, at 531 (stating the fiduciary duty
"falls short of the standard set in American case law and statutes").
246. See Grossfeld, Management and Control, supra note 102, at 56.
247. See generally Munyon, supra note 177, at 231. For the current changes,
see infra, Part F.
248. See AktG § 1(1) (stating "The stock corporation is a company which consti-
tutes a separate legal entity").
249. See Eckert, supra note 53, at 12. See generally Kijbler, German Dilemma,
supra note 130, at 98 ("The general structure of German corporate law is very
rigid-).
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group." Managers are officers of the corporation and their
employees only. Therefore, directors can owe their duties only
to their contractual partner, the corporation."5 And, since the
procedural side of suing usually mirrors the substantive law,
i.e., the right to bring an action on the basis of a breach of
duty follows this duty and its beneficiary, enforcement of man-
agerial duties has to lie in the hands of the corporation. Al-
though it is obvious that any violation of duty that harms the
corporation is likely to have a negative impact on the value of
the shares (and thus to its shareholders as well), such "indi-
rect" harm is deemed to be outside the scope of the pertinent
doctrinal concept.1 2 In other words, as far as enforcement is
concerned, "indirect" harm to shareholders is regularly regard-
ed as legally irrelevant. 3
Under German law, the pursuit of all kinds of claims is, in
principle, left to the managers.2 4 At the same time, however,
as in the United States, there is some apprehension that man-
agers will not take an action on behalf of the company against
250. See Eckert, supra note 53, at 60; Richard M. Buxbaum, Extension of Par-
ent Company Shareholders' Rights to Participate in the Governance of Subsidiaries,
31 AM. J. COMP. L. 511, 513 (1983) [hereinafter Buxbaum, Governance of Subsid-
iaries].
251. See Buxbaum, Governance of Subsidiaries, supra note 250, at 513; Peter
Schlechtriem, Schadenersatzhaftung der Leitungsorgane von Kapitalgesellschaften, in
DIE HAFTUNG DER LEITUNGSORGANE VON KAPITALGESELLSCHAFTEN 9, 61 (Karl
Kreuzer ed., 1991); Uwe H. Schneider, Haftungsmilderung bei fehlerhafter
Unternehmensleitung?, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR WINFRIED WERNER 795, 799 (1991)
[hereinafter Schneider, Haftungsmilderung]; von Samson-Himselstjerna, supra note
245, at 291; Joachim, supra~note 235, at 64.
252. A mere depreciation of equity holdings in a corporation does not constitute
a direct damage under German law. However, case law has established liability in
a situation in which management sells shares to a purchaser with the "conditional
intent" (bedingtem Vorsatz) that the stock price would subsequently fall. See
Eckert, supra note 53, at 67.
253. See HOFFER, supra note 242, § 93, cmt. 19; HANS-JOACHIMI MERTENS, 2
KOLNER KONIMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ § 93 (2d ed., 1990) (both leading commen-
tators in the field of corporate law); Eckert, supra note 53, at 43. See also Aharon
Barak, A Comparative Look at Protection of the Shareholder Interest: Variations on
the Derivative Suit, 20 INTL & COMP. L.Q. 22, 39 (1971) (stating that the "compa-
ny is the party affected, and, therefore, it alone is entitled for relief"). Based on
tort principles, shareholders certainly have, in exceptional contingencies, individual
causes of actions. See AktG § 117; Wittuhn, supra note 238, at 310; HOFFER, su-
pra note 242, at cmts. 1-14 (stating further details). However, since these actions
are typically based on fraud or deceit, courts need not invoke a fiduciary relation-
ship between the manager and the harmed shareholder. See Eckert, supra note 53,
at 61.
254. See MERTENS, supra note 253, § 93, cmt. 51.
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themselves. It has therefore been provided by statute that, in
the case of breach of a fiduciary duty, both the power to decide
whether the company should sue and the responsibility to file
the suit has to be exercised by the supervisory board
(Aufsichtsrat).25 Yet, the Aufsichtsrat might also be reluctant
to sue the allegedly faulty managers. One reason may be that
the board deems the evidence insufficient for establishing a
prima facie breach of duty case. Or members of the
Aufsichtsrat may be too closely involved in management's ac-
tivities to objectively perceive the supposed misconduct. 6 Fi-
nally, the board may, at times, even have been involved in a
breach of fiduciary duties themselves. AktG section 147 pro-
vides that under such circumstances, a shareholders' meeting
may be held upon the request of the shareholders. At this
meeting, a majority of shareholders can decide (the
Aufsichtsrat's reluctance notwithstanding), that the company
should go ahead with an action against the supposed manage-
rial wrongdoers. However, since the Aufsichtsrat is mainly
elected by shareholders, and is supposed to represent them in
any matter (including the issue of whether or not to initiate a
lawsuit), it is somewhat unlikely that the majority of share-
holders will contradict the Aufsichtsrats' decision not to sue
and decide to vote in favor of enforcement.
Both the supervisory board's refusal, and the concurring
vote of the majority, can be set aside by a group of minority
shareholders. To be heard, such a group must represent at
least one tenth of the stated capital for a minimum of three
months prior to the date of the shareholders' meeting.27 A
class action is traditionally unknown in Germany.258 Assum-
ing shareholders meet this high capital requirement,2 9 they
255. It should be noted that, on the other hand, actions against members of
the supervising group have to be asserted by the managing group. See AktG § 78.
256. See Barak, supra note 253, at 39.
257. See AktG § 147(1). But see discussion infra Part F.
258. See Joachim, supra note 235, at 41, 66. Once this capital holding require-
ment is met, such shareholders may prevent any waiver of the claim being ap-
proved by a general meeting. See AktG §§ 50, 93(4).
259. See Roger Kiem, Diskussion zu den Referaten Mertens und Coffee, in COR-
PORATE GOVERNANCE: OPTIMIERUNG DER UNTERNEHMENSFOHRUNG UND DER
UNTERNEHMENSKONTROLLE IM DEUTSCHEN UND AMEPJKANISCHEN AxTIENRECHT 214
(Dieter Feddersen et al. eds., 1996) (summarizing the contribution of a German
participant who remarked that, in the case of Metallgesellschaft, the minimum
stated capital required to initiate a lawsuit against management would have been
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may, for the purpose of redressing the damages, also appoint a
special representative (Besonderer Vertreter)."° However,
they are not entitled to sue the directors derivatively on behalf
of the corporation. In deciding to bring the suit, both the
shareholder group and the Besonderer Vertreter only act as
"internal" agents of the company, "standing in the shoes" of the
genuinely competent organ, the Aufsichtsrat.26" The lawsuit
inevitably remains the action of the corporation. It follows
that, unlike American law, the company itself functions as a
plaintiff in suits against members of its management
board.262 A minority suit by way of a class action is also tra-
ditionally unknown in Germany.263
C. A Tentative Analysis
Under American law, a group of shareholders is not con-
sidered a genuine corporate organ for the purpose of enforcing
directors' duties. Rather, U.S. corporate law focusses on each
individual shareholder, and allows him or her to take over the
litigation against faulty managers and prosecute it on behalf of
the corporation (although not in its name). The current law in
Germany, in contrast, does not permit individual shareholders
to sue. Under the Aktiengesetz, the corporation itself has the
ultimate authority to enforce managerial duties. Any action
that is ultimately brought on the shareholders' demand must
originate in the shareholders' meeting, and be filed in accor-
dance with the pertinent internal procedures of the sharehold-
ers assembly.2 4 Only a group of shareholders whose com-
bined holdings amount to no less than ten percent of the out-
standing capital can overcome the denial of both the
Aufsichtsrat and the majority of shareholders, and force the
corporation to redress the manager faults. The German ap-
no less then DM .44 million).
260. See AktG § 147(3).
261. See JORG H. GESSLER, KOmEENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ ANN. § 147, cmt. 6
(1988); HERBERT WIEDEMANN, ORGANVERANTWORTUNG UND GESELLSCHAFrERKLAGEN
49 (1989); Barak, supra note 253, at 40.
262. See Steefel & von Falkenhausen, supra note 62, at 548; Eckert, supra note
53, at 73. By contrast, in a derivative suit under American law, the corporation is
an indispensable party on the side of the defendant. See Buxbaum & Schneider,
supra note 211, at 204.
263. See Joachim, supra note 235, at 66.
264. See Eckert, supra note 53, at 72.
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proach has therefore been characterized as a "group approach"
as opposed to the American "individualistic approach."265
In addition to the high hurdles created by the Aktiengesetz,
there is yet another aspect that distinguishes the United
States and the German system, and deters German minority
shareholders from forcing the company to sue its directors:
rules dealing with litigation expenses. Even though the prob-
lem of indemnification for litigation expenses is not a question
governed by German corporate law (but rather an issue of Civil
Procedure), it nevertheless has a strong impact on the practical
nonexistence of a shareholder suit in Germany.266 Like many
other civil law countries, the German Civil Procedure Code
(Zivilprozessordnung)267 dictates that the losing party alone,
and not its lawyer, bears the litigation costs of both parties in-
volved.268 Contingency fee devices, common in the United
States, are unknown in German law. Allowing a lawyer to file
a suit under a contingency arrangement is regarded as uneth-
ical and inconsistent with public policy. Thus, if a private par-
ty brings an action, he or she takes the risk of losing, regard-
less of the fact that possible benefits, if any, belong to someone
else (e.g., to a corporation). Applying this rule in the context of
shareholder suits, one might think that, since under German
law the plaintiff necessarily is not a shareholder but the corpo-
ration, shareholders may in return not be responsible for the
cost incurred. Yet, despite the soundness of this assumption,
265. Thomas Raiser, Das Recht der Gesellschafterklagen, 153 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 1, 24 (1989) [hereinafter
Gesellschafterklagen]; Eckert, supra note 53, at 70; Barak, supra note 253, at 40.
It should be noted that this "group approach" has a long tradition. See § 268
Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB) [Commercial Code] as of May 10, 1897; AktG, v.
04.02.1937 (RGB1. I S.219) § 122. In 1937, the German law of the
Aktiengesellschaft, previously contained in the Commercial Code, was re-enacted
and amended in a special statute of 1937, the "Aktiengesetz." Although "[clertain
features of this . . . law reflect[ed] the influence of Nazi ideology the provisions
pertinent to [the concept of the corporation as a separate entity and the share-
holder suits are] hardly more than a restatement of the law prior to the Nazi
regime." Maximilian Koessler, The Stockholder's Suit: A Comparative View, 46
COLUM. L. REv. 238, 251 (1946). For more information about the historical back-
ground, see Grossfeld & Ebke, Unternehmensverfassung, supra note 175, at 97.
266. See Grossfeld, supra note 102, at 110.
267. See § 91 Nr. 2 ZPO, 92 [Civil Procedure Code].
268. For a discussion of comparable rules in Japan, see Mark D. West, The
Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions in Japan and the United States, 88 NW.
U.L. REv. 1436, 1463 (1994).
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the legal situation is different. AktG section 147, paragraph 4
expressly provides that if the suit is lost, the party which
pressed the claim will be liable to the corporation for the cost
incurred. The Legislature deemed such regulation necessary to
prevent any abuses of this minority right. Actually, however,
meritorious suits have been discouraged as well.
Because complaining shareholders may only enforce a
company's right of recovery against the Vorstand under the
special circumstances described above, the pertinent sections
in the Aktiengesetz ironically have been evaluated as "dead
letters."26 ' Sparse use of the Aktiengesetz' devices can easily
be attributed to requirements which are so strict that they are
virtually impossible to overcome.70 Under the Aktiengesetz, a
shareholder having less then the required capital investment
of ten percent would have to contact, and then convince, other
shareholders to join his or her interest."' Given the wide-
spread apathy of small shareholders, and the lack of organized
shareholder groups with both sufficient access to information
about actionable events and expertise to represent minorities,
the necessity of requiring such concerted action generally poses
great difficulties.2 Further, as briefly stated above, such
groups face a high and deterrent cost risk. Due to these imped-
iments in overcoming the problem of enforcement, over the
269. See Thomas Raiser, Pflicht und Ermessen von Aufsichtsratsmitgliedern, 49
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIr1 552 (1996) [hereinafter Raiser,
Aufsichtsratsmitglieder]; Joachim, supra note 235, at 41, 66. Although both authors
explicitly address only the judicial enforcement of Aufsichtsrats' liability, their
observations are to the same extent true for Vorstands' accountability. See also
Grossfeld, supra note 102, at 110; Munyon, supra note 177, at 231. Hermann Abs,
former CEO of Deutsche Bank AG and perhaps the most prominent manager of
the German postwar era, stated that "It is easier to grab a pig at its soapy tail
than to hold the manager of a German corporation liable."
270. See Hans-Joachim Mertens, Organhaftung, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
OPTMIERUNG DER UNTERNEHMENSFOHRUNG UND DER UNTERNEHMENSKONTROLLE IM
DEUTSCHEN UND AMERIKANISCHEN AKTIENREcHT 155, 157 (Dieter Feddersen et al.
eds., 1996).
271. Shareholders holding ten percent of a corporation's capital, on the other
hand, might be able to accomplish their objectives either through informal means
of control or through their representative at the Aufsichtsrat. See Barak, supra
note 253, at 40. See also discussion infra Part F (for the current amendments of
the Aktiengesetz).
272. Until now, not many minority suits initiated by shareholder groups pursu-
ant to AktG § 147 have been reported. These groups so far seem to focus on reso-
lutions at the shareholders' meeting and on frequent appearance in the media. But
see SUDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, supra note 82.
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years of its existence, managerial liability has hardly ever been
found pursuant to a shareholder request according to AktG
section 147.73
All this seems to compel a conclusion that the rather weak
substitute German law offers for the U.S. model of derivative
litigation may under no circumstances sufficiently protect
shareholders' interests. However, shareholder litigation is only
one of a range of devices to redress uncovered misconduct.
And, as a matter of fact, corporate law in Germany provides
another mechanism of assuring directors' performance that
distinguishes it from American corporate law: the supervisory
board (Aufsichtsrat). If the members of the supervisory board
effectively control those who manage the corporation, there
might be less, or even no need for a strong system of judicial
enforcement guided by shareholders. 4
D. The Supervisory Board as an Efficient Control Mechanism?
Like all modern corporate laws, both the American and the
German systems provide for special organs to carry on the
business of the corporation. However, the technical structure
varies. Whereas American corporations are run under the
supervision of a single board, German corporations
(Aktiengesellschaften) are organized under the Stock Corpora-
tion Act, and have a two-tier system.' On one side, there is
the Vorstand. The Vorstand is the executive body or "board of
management."276 Its members decide the corporation's policy,
273. An analysis that simply asserts that German shareholders do not sue
because they "may be more passive than the Americans" fails to take into account
that it appears to be the given enforcement system which is responsible for their
"passivity." See Vagts, Perspectives from the German, supra note 49, at 60.
274. See Eckert, supra note 53, at 72 (pointing to the "inseparable connection"
between the system of judicial enforcement and the function of the Aufsichtsrat).
Commentators have also emphasized that due to differences in the social structure
of both countries, Germany should be cautious in adopting the strong American
shareholder litigation mechanism. Since this article is limited to a discussion of
some legal issues of corporate governance in both countries, more fundamental
socio-cultural questions are not further discussed here. For a thorough investiga-
tion, see Grossfeld & Ebke, Unternehmensverfassung, supra note 175, at 98;
Grossfeld, supra note 102, at 130-31.
275. See Roth, supra note 92, at 1373 (stating that the personal and functional
separation of management and supervision clearly distinguishes the German
Aufsichtsrat from the U.S. board of directors); CONARD, supra note 24, at 8;
Eckert, supra note 53, at 28.
276. See AktG § 76(1) (stating that the Vorstand has "direct responsibility for
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and actually run the corporation's day-to-day affairs.277 The
Aufsichtsrat, as the second tier, is created for the sole purpose
of supervising the Vorstand as the managing group.27 As a
kind of continuous representative of the shareholders between
their meetings, the Aufsichtsrat is supposed to be the guardian
of their interests."9 The Vorstand is obliged to provide infor-
mation about the business performance of the firm on a regu-
lar basis. ° Frequently, the charter, or the by-laws of the cor-
poration, additionally require Aufsichtsrats approval for spe-
cific kinds of transactions.28' The power of the Aufsichtsrat to
challenge managers' decisions is by no means restricted to
legal issues. Rather, it covers any aspect that is related to the
corporation.282 On the other hand, typical managerial func-
tions cannot be transferred to the Aufsichtsrat.28' Extensive
contractual transfer of managerial competencies would blur the
fundamental distinction between the two organs.2 The inde-
pendence of the Aufsichtsrat is maintained by a provision in
the Stock Corporation Act that prohibits simultaneous mem-
bership in both the managing and the supervising group. 85
Its members, which are elected by the shareholders, appoint
and remove the members of the Vorstand as the executive
body.286
the management of the company").
277. Joachim, supra note 235, at 43 (noting that members of the Aufsichtsrat
are "somehow" comparable with U.S. outside directors).
278. See AktG § 111(1).
279. See Raiser, Aufsichtsratsmitglieder, supra note 269, at 554.
280. See Wittuhn, supra note 238, at 311.
281. See Detlev F. Vagts, The European System, 27 BUS. LAW. 165, 167 (1972)
[hereinafter Vagts, The European System].
282. See Joachim, supra note 235, at 46 (giving further references). An addi-
tional approval by the shareholders' meeting is only required for issues which
would result in a fundamental change in corporate structure. Id.
283. See AktG § 111(4).
284. See Wittuhn, supra note 238, at 311; Joachim, supra note 235, at 45;
Eckert, supra note 53, at 23. An exception from this principle is the representa-
tion of the Aktiengesellschaft in a lawsuit against the Vorstand. Here, the
Aufsichtsrat takes over the duty to represent the corporation. See AktG § 112.
285. See AktG § 105.
286. See AktG § 84. On the other hand, management is usually able to elect
some of its candidates as members of the Aufsichtsrat. Moreover, the Vorstand has
also a decisive role in the selection of its own members. See, e.g., Padraic Fallon,
The Battle Plans of Hilmar Kopper, EUROMONEY, Jan. 1994, at 39 (containing an
interview with the CEO of Deutsche Bank, who explains that the Vorstand usually
requests that the Aufsichtsrat approve recommendations given by the Vorstand).
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In light of this statutory approach, one might conclude
that supervision by an independent group such as the
Aufsichtsrat in fact may replace, or render superfluous, the
U.S.- like shareholder action as a means to align the interests
of directors and shareholders."7 Indeed, in the last 30 years
the supervisory board has, in general, successfully fulfilled its
"watch dog" function to prevent serious abuses and react in
case of management's gross negligence. Nevertheless, the past
has also shown serious failures on the part of the board."'5
Because of this, it has been questioned whether German corpo-
rate law should rely on the Aufsichtsrat's supervision. A review
of criticisms of the performance of the supervisory board in
largely held public corporations reveals mainly four weak
points: (1) according to some commentators, the Aufsichtsrat
has, in some corporations, become a part of the management
and therefore has lost its ability to objectively monitor the
Vorstand;.9 (2) It has changed into an "organization for busi-
ness contacts and friendships," where members occasionally
work to perpetuate each other's "power and perks;"2 0 (3) The
Aufsichtsrat still effectively exercises supervision, but does not
represent all shareholders. One example is especially prom-
inent: The traditionally strong position of banks in the German
corporation and its Aufsichtsrat has lead critics to conclude
that by representing both themselves29' and their trustees,
e.g., through the voting rights conferred on them, banks exert
control, in pursuit not of the interest of all of those individual
shareholders who have given their proxies, but mainly in pur-
287. See CONARD, supra note 24, at 403 (claiming that the supervisory board is
compensation for the weakness of shareholder suits); Raiser, Gesellschafterklagen,
supra note 265, at 9 (summarizing this viewpoint).
288. See, e.g., Judgment of Dec. 21, 1979, Bundesgerichtshof, 33 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1629 (1980) (holding member of the Aufsichtsrat
liable for proposing to the Vorstand to give securities to a company with a doubt-
ful credit standing).
289. See Raiser, Aufsichtsratsmitglieder, supra note 269, at 553.
290. See generally GO)NTER OGGER, NIETEN IN NADELSTREIFEN-DEUTSCHLANDS
MANAGER IM ZWIELICHT (1992) (giving examples for German managements misbe-
havior). Ogger's book, which was a long time bestseller in Germany, may be trans-
lated as "Dummies in Business Suits" See also Thomas J. Andr6, Jr., Some Reflec-
tions on German Corporate Governance: A Glimpse at German Supervisory Boards,
70 TUL. L. REV. 1819, 1822 (1996) (briefly summarizing this viewpoint).
291. Banks are significant shareholders in their own right in most German
publicly-held corporations. See Immenga, supra note 86 and accompanying text for
more detailed information.
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suit of their own and possibly conflicting interest.2  More-
over, the current system, which allows individuals to be a
member of the supervisory board of several corporations (a
system of interlocking directorates), has given rise to conflict of
interest issues;" and (4) There are situations in which the
members of the supervisory board are so closely connected to
management that they become unwilling to act in compliance
with the statutory requirements imposed upon them. Collegial-
ity might thus make them hesitant to commence an action
against those who run the business, even when uncovering
clear evidence of managerial misbehavior 4.2 " This observation
is supplemented by evidence which shows that the additional
power of the Aufsichtsrat to dismiss members of the manage-
ment board is rarely used.9
E. Is the German System Changing?
Although German legal scholars and the Bundes-
gerichtshof fPr Zivilsachen as the highest German Court for,
i.e., corporate law have widely remained hesitant to change the
strong doctrinal framework governing corporate law, or even to
partially recognize the American derivative suit concept,29
there is now agreement among the majority of academics and
politicians that some change in the given system of sharehold-
er protection is desirable.297 While keeping in mind the obser-
vations broadly outlined above, it is therefore worthwhile to
292. See Raiser, Einflul der Kreditinstitute, supra note 95, at 2258. See also
Roth, supra note 92, at 1378 (summarizing this point and the preceding observa-
tions).
293. See, e.g., Andr6, Jr., supra note 290, at 1822; Joachim, supra note 235, at
53 (describing the "dilemma of multiple loyalties"). Under the Aktiengesetz, howev-
er, cross-membership on the Aufsichtsrat and Vorstand of two or more corporations
is prohibited. See AktG § 100(2).
294. Norbert Horn, Die Haftung des Vorstands der AG nach § 93 AktG und die
Pflichten des Aufsichtsrats, 18 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFrSRECHT 1129, 1130
(1997).
295. On the other hand, it has been established that there is a certain level of
non-renewal of contracts. See Baums, Corporate Governance, supra note 94, at 505-
06; Horn, supra note 294, at 1130.
296. See WIEDEMIN, supra note 261, at 42 (stating that German corporate law
traditionally has a hostile attitude toward shareholder suits and suggesting that
this attitude is at least partly due to the fact that managers as an interest group
were successful in convincing legislatures in the German post-war era not to ease
judicial mechanisms to enforce fiduciary standards).
297. For current proposals and changes, see text infra Part 3.
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examine the current discussion and the reasons for this devel-
opment more closely.
1. Economic Incentives
Traditional arguments against a tough mechanism of
shareholder litigation formerly were based on the successful
performance of German corporations under the present law,
and a skeptical view of allowing individual shareholders access
to the courts. The fact that Germany has developed one of the
world's largest and most successful economies has been at
least partially attributed to its corporate governance and regu-
latory standards. For years, there simply seemed to be no
serious economic incentive to change the doctrinal framework
that governs corporate law. However, at least since the early
1990s, Germany realized that economic success under a partic-
ular system, and its legal and regulatory devices in the past,
does not guarantee economic success in the future. The fact
that over the last five years quite a few well-known German
corporations have crashed, or sustained huge losses has, inter
alia, raised fundamental doubts about the quality of the given
system, and has made observers more sensitive to corporate
governance issues."' A number of widely-publicized financial
difficulties of German companies, and an array of spectacular
"scandals" (most notably the affairs at IBH, Neue Heimat
GmbH, Co-op, Bayerische Raiffaisenbank, Girmes AG, Ham-
mer Bank, Harpener AG, Schneider299, Metallgesellschaft3 °0 ,
and, more recently, the Bremer Vulkan matter), has triggered
substantial criticism of the manner in which German corpora-
tions monitor those who run the business.0 1
Moreover, while politicians and economists widely agree
that liberalization and opening of the German financial mar-
kets is inevitable in order to attract more investors, 30 2 law-
298. See Assmann et al., The Law of Business Associations, supra note 71, at
148; Raiser, Einflu3 der Kreditinstitute, supra note 95, at 2260; Feddersen et al.,
Corporate Governance, supra note 11, at 4 (stating that the performance of Ger-
man corporations recently has been subject to some serious criticism).
299. See, e.g., Nicholas Bray, Scandals Knock Deutsche Bank's Image, WALL ST.
J., July 5, 1994, at A8.
300. See also Andrew Fisher, Metallgesellschaft: The Oil Deals That Crippled a
German Metal-Trading Giant, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1995, at 20.
301. See generally Joachim, supra note 235, at 41.
302. See Breuer, supra note 181, at v; Buxbaum, Institutional Owners, supra
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yers feel forced to think about impediments caused by the
embodying legal system. Observers raise concern that if, for
example, an institutional investor from abroad, (who, it is
assumed, highly values liability rules as a governance mecha-
nism), finds evidence that the pertinent legal framework in
Germany is insufficient, he or she might decide to put money
elsewhere.0 3 Beside the growing importance of international
investors, it is worth remembering that German politicians
intensively try to make investment in equity more attractive
for private households, too. Given the partial success of these
efforts, the number of small shareholders will further increase.
Consequently, the demand for additional control mechanisms,
including the judicial enforcement of managers' liability for
misbehavior or negligence, will become greater."4 As individ-
ual and institutional investors expand their use of stock pur-
chases, and the need for investor protection correspondingly
increases, it seems predictable that the impact of gaps in the
regulatory environment will become more significant.
2. The Deterring Effect of Abuses
Possibly the most serious concern German commentators
have voiced is the danger that lessening the requirements for
shareholder litigation will inevitably result in over-enforce-
ment, and trigger an avalanche of litigation. More specifically,
it has been conjectured that the implementation of a U.S.- like
shareholder suit would not be of any benefit for the corpora-
tion, but rather of benefit for the shareholder-plaintiffs and
their lawyers.0 5 This assumption is supplemented by a prev-
alent feeling that German managers should be free to take
note 125, at 26-27; Feddersen et al., Corporate Governance, supra note 11, at 2
(pointing to the increasing number of international institutional investors in Ger-
many).
303. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE, supra note 178, at 30 (stating
that American pension funds "bring their corporate governance standards with
them").
304. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE, supra note 178, at ii, 30 (sug-
gesting that, institutional investors "can be expected to introduce a more active
form of shareholding"). See generally CLARK, supra note 16, at 20. It should be
kept in mind that in 1995, only 17% of the shares in German corporations were
held by individual investors. See Feddersen et al., Corporate Governance, supra
note 11, at 2-3.
305. For a recent statement, see Feddersen et al., Corporate Governance, supra
note 11, at 5, 8.
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risks.. and has been buttressed by pointing at the U.S.
scene." 7 Indeed, support for the claim that shareholder liti-
gation might have these negative effects can easily be found in
U.S. courtrooms. Looking to the U.S. experience, it does seem
reasonable to argue that giving each individual shareholder a
right to sue might lead to undue pressure upon the company
and pointless court decisions. Corporations, driven by the de-
sire to prevent negative publicity, have in the United States,
even occasionally agreed to settle suits despite their question-
able merits. Therefore, American commentators have repeat-
edly questioned the positive impact of shareholder suits, espe-
cially of those who attack typical managerial business deci-
sions."' Yet, those proponents who emphasize the occurrence
of strike suits should not ignore that American courts have
found ways to significantly reduce the likelihood of such frivo-
lous suits, e.g., the demand requirement and the business
judgment rule."0 9 And just like American state and common
law, German corporate law may within its own framework be
able to prevent pressure and interference with the business of
the company-not by strictly denying the shareholders' right to
intervene, but rather by appropriately shaping the scope of
shareholder litigation and establishing legal provisions which
ensure that this device would not be wrongly exploited.10
3. Aspirations for Reform
In light of both a rapidly-changing economic scene, and the
partly poor performance of German corporations, reformers
have begun to argue for change in the German corporate law
306. See Steefel & von Falkenhausen, supra note 62, at 532. The present sys-
tem which bars minority shareholders from commencing a suit if they do not rep-
resent the required percentage has so far at least incidentally prevented "strike
suits." See Eckert, supra note 53, at 81.
307. European scholars regularly emphasize this aspect. See, e.g., Andr6 Tunc,
Corporate Law, in EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES OF
INTEGRATION AND HARMONIZATION 199, 211 (Richard M. Buxbaum et al. eds., 1991)
(stating that U.S. directors "whatever they do or do not do, are threatened by law
suits").
308. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 29, at 149 ("it is far from obvious that
[managers] should be liable for damages" and that "the prospect of judicial second
guessing' might make corporate officials overly risk averse").
309. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 29, at 150.
310. See WIEDEMANN, supra note 261, at 43.
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structure. Critics have recently filled the field of German cor-
porate governance with wide-ranging proposals covering a
broad spectrum of corrective measures. Nearly all of these
suggestions come, inter alia, as direct changes of the current
laws regarding minority shareholder protection. Aspirations for
reform focus on a strengthened system of judicial control of
managerial misbehavior on the level of both the Vorstand and
the Aufsichtsrat. With respect to their substance, recommenda-
tions in this field basically fall into two categories:. 1 One
body suggests that the curtailing capital holding limitation in
AktG section 147 be changed. 12 According to this proposal, it
should suffice for a lawsuit against faulty managers to go for-
ward if shareholders representing five percent (instead of ten
percent of corporate capital under the given law) or a mini-
mum stated capital of one million Deutsche Mark so decide.313
Legal scholars, most of them familiar with the U.S. model of
corporate governance, on the other hand, recommend that an
additional device be established which gives even a single
shareholder the right to press a claim against members of the
Vorstand and the Aufsichtsrat, respectively. "  However,
311. But see Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich
(KonTraG), v. 27.04.1998 (BGBl. I S.786) (amendment of the Aktiengesetz that
combines different approaches, as discussed infra, Part F).
312. For a summary of this approach and further details, see Raiser, Einflu3
der Kreditinsitute, supra note 95, at 2260. See also John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Organhaftung im amerikanischen Recht, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: OPTIrIIERUNG
DER UNTERNEHMENSFMIRUNG UND DER UNTERNEHMENSKONTROLLE IM DEUTSCHEN
UND AMERIKANISCHEN AKTIENRECHT 165, 206 (Dieter Feddersen et al. eds., 1996)
[hereinafter Coffee, Organhaftung] (evaluating proposals from an American view-
point on how to change the European system of shareholder litigation).
313. See Ulrich Seibert, Aufsichtsrats-Reform in der 13. Wahiperiode: Zum
aktuellen Stand der rechtspolitischen Diskussion, 5 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR BANKREcHT
UND BANKWIRTSCHAFr 349, 352 (1994). A similar approach is taken by the Amend-
ed Fifth concerning the structure of public limited companies and the powers and
obligations of their organs. Art. 16 provides that:
[Piroceedings on behalf of the company ... may also be commenced if so
requested . . . by one or more shareholders: (a) who hold shares of a cer-
tain nominal or accounting par value which the Member States shall not
require to be greater than 5% of the subscribed capital.
Amended Fifth, supra note 170, at 790.
314. See Kiibler, Referat, supra note 123, at n.23; Marcus Lutter, Defizite far
eine effiziente Aufischtsratstitigkeit und gesetzliche M6glichkeiten der Verbesserung,
159 ZEITScHRIFT FOR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFIBRECHT 287,
306 (1995) [hereinafter Lutter, Verbesserung der Aufsichtsratstditigkeit]; Raiser,
Einflufl der Kreditinstitute, supra note 95, at 2261; WIEDEMANN, supra note 261, at
40-56.
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there is so far no consensus about how far this individual right
should be extended.
F. Reforming the Shareholder Action in Germany
The past years have shown that the supervisory board
(Aufsichtsrat) does not always exercise control at the level
required by the German Stock Corporation Act.315 Deficien-
cies in internal monitoring and economic need to increase the
capitalization of the German stock market may leave few
doubts about the necessity of a change toward better share-
holder protection. As scholars and politicians in Germany con-
tinue to revise their approaches for the pertinent regulation,
difficult questions remain: What exactly should a change look
like? Can the American system provide an effective model for
Germany? Or should any proposal stop short of requiring fun-
damental changes in the existing judicial framework and its
rules of standing and procedure? And, perhaps even more im-
portantly: What kind of change, if at all, is most likely to take
place under the prevailing circumstances?
1. Changing the Minimum Capital Requirement?
A decrease in the capital requirement for minority litiga-
tion from 10% to, e.g. 5% appears to be an attractive compro-
mise for both sides of the debate. Not surprisingly, the newly
enacted AktG section 147 paragraph 3 adheres to this ap-
proach. It now requires that a motion must be brought by
shareholders whose aggregate holdings equal or exceed one-
twentieth of the share capital or the par value of two million
Deutsche Mark. Yet such bright-line rules always run the risk
of being both under-and-over-inclusive. Indeed, on one hand,
this amendment may not go far enough. The threshold can still
be too high with regard to those large publicly listed companies
which have widely dispersed owners. It still carries the defect
of denying access to the court for a "small" shareholder who
does not represent 5% of the stated capital, but who neverthe-
less genuinely believes that an action against management is
315. See Hopt, Directors' Duties, supra note 237, at 131 & n.81 (listing the
decisions).
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warranted.316 Such deprivation admittedly has no negative
impact if shareholders' belief is only based on singular and
erroneous impressions of managerial performance. But when
managers objectively violate their duties they owe to the corpo-
ration, the consent (or the apathy) of a vast majority of share-
holders should not automatically constitute an absolute de-
fense against a meritorious claim.317 Too much injury might
go unremedied if commencement of suits against faulty man-
agers always required coordinated action of five percent of the
entire holdings. Without a shareholder right to force the corpo-
ration to go forward with a lawsuit, managers may, under
circumstances short of criminal fraud, even decide to distribute
their firms' most valuable assets to someone with a highly
doubtful credit standing without being held accountable.31
On the other hand, an approach demanding a certain min-
imum capital investment appears to be somewhat inflexible
and overinclusive.319 Shareholders are not a homogenous
group. An action that is not in the interest of the majority may
be-for whatever reason-in the interest of some.32 ° Since the
Aktiengesetz clearly favors majoritarian decisions over any "mi-
316. See WIEDEMANN, supra note 261, at 50; Barak, supra note 253, at 48.
317. However, one could make the argument that, at least in principle, there
should be no recognition at all of a shareholder's interest in intervening in
managers' activities. It could be asserted that the shareholder, since he has invest-
ed money in the company, is only a creditor of the company and thus should only
be treated like all creditors. See Don Berger, Shareholder Rights under the Ger-
man Stock Corporation Law of 1965, 38 FoRDHAM L. REV. 687, 689 (1970) (assert-
ing that because shareholders collectively are regarded as the ultimate owners
does not alter the conclusion that the individual shareholder's rights are not equiv-
alent to ownership rights). However, neither U.S. corporate law nor the German
Stock Corporation Act seem to accept such reasoning. The argument overlooks that
there is an essential difference-not only economic but legal as well-"between a
creditor and a shareholder. The former has [only a contract with] the company,
the latter has not only [a contract], but also personal rights in the company." See
Barak, supra note 253, at 45 (citations omitted). Taking into account shareholders'
role as claimants on the residual value of the enterprise, managers have an obli-
gation to increase this residual value, rather than the wealth of the contractual
partners like creditors or employees. See generally CLARK, supra note 16, at 18;
Hart, supra note 236, at 303 (for an economic perspective).
318. See WIEDEMANN, supra note 261, at 40-41. It should be kept in mind that
dismissal as another way to stop the directors under German law is not within
the competence of the shareholders, but in the exclusive competence of the
Aufsichtsrat.
319. See Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich
(KonTraG), v. 27.04.1998 (BGB1. I S.786).
320. Hart, supra note 236, at 307.
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nority concept,"32' a deviation from the Stock Corporations
Act's prevalent tendency to respect shareholder democracy
should only be accepted if such an divergence would be in the
best interest of the corporation.322 A mechanical rule cannot
guarantee this.
2. A Push Toward the American Model?
Taking this into consideration, it becomes clear that the
clear-cut concept of a capital holding limitation on shareholder
suits is not a preferable option. Proposals to let even share-
holders with only small stakes in the venture redress damages
caused by managerial misbehavior or negligence, by contrast,
should be aware that a certain material threshold is needed to
balance the likelihood of strategic or opportunistic actions."
It therefore has been suggested, for example, to prescribe by
law that no shareholder should compel the company to go
forward with the lawsuit without prior permission from either
a court or a special representative." AktG section 147, para-
graph 3, as amended by "KonTraG," sets up a two step pro-
ceeding: First, a minority shareholder attacking a managerial
decision has to either come forward with a prima facie case of
"gross violation" of the managers' standard of care, to substan-
tially allege a knowing and culpable violation of law, or, final-
ly, to establish particular facts showing a managerial breach of
the duty of loyalty, such as self-dealing.2 5 Second, it is upon
this court-appointed representative's diligent and conscientious
discretion to evaluate the merits of such claim. If he or she
considers that the action is clearly unfounded, he or she may
refuse permission."
321. Buxbaum, Governance of Subsidiaries, supra note 250, at 513.
322. See WIEDEMANN, supra note 261, at 50; Raiser, Gesellschafterklagen, supra
note 265, at 15; Lutter, Verbesserung der Aufsichtsratstiitigkeit, supra note 314, at
306 n.77. Admittedly, it could be argued that AktG § 147 is already based upon a
partial recognition of a "minority concept."
323. See Fischel & Bradley, supra note 226, at 271-72 (suggesting that share-
holders with tiny investments have only little incentive to consider the effect of
the action on other shareholders).
324. See Coffee, Organhaftung, supra note 312, at 207; Raiser, Einflufl der
Kreditinstitute, supra note 95, at 2261.
325. See Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich
(KonTraG), v. 27.04.1998 (BGB1. I S.786). See also KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note
29, at 151 (listing comparable amendments of U.S. state corporate statutes).
326. See Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternebmensbereich
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Other models involve a U.S.-like "demand" requirement,
suggesting that shareholders have to prove that the superviso-
ry board, as well as the majority of shareholders, have refused
to initiate a legal proceeding against the manager. 2 ' All this
has been regarded as a useful device to prevent exaggerated
shareholder activism and its possible negative effects.328
These models also claim the advantage of ensuring, to some
degree, that small investors believe they have access to a rem-
edy if management is cheating and therefore offers consider-
able, albeit limited protection for minority shareholders.
Doctrinal justification for such a remodeling has been
borrowed from the Bundesgerichtshofs well-recognized
Holzmueller decision. 9  In this landmark case, the
Bundesgerichtshof expressly affirmed the possibility of an indi-
vidually-initiated shareholder action. Admittedly, this was a
case where management acted without the required assent of
the shareholder meeting. But an analogy to such a situation
where an internal irregularity in the decision-making process
of the corporation was in question, has been drawn here in the
managerial liability setting.33 In both cases management is
(KonTraG), v. 27.04.1998 (BGBI. I S.786); Raiser, Einflu3 der Kreditinstitute, supra
note 95, at 2261; Lutter, Verbesserung der Aufsichtsratstdtigkeit, supra note 314, at
306.
327. But see WIEDEMANN, supra note 261, at 48 (arguing against an "internal
demand" requirement).
328. See generally CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 21, at 1034; CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE, supra note 178, at 36.
329. See Judgment of Feb. 25, 1982, Bundesgerichtshof, reprinted in 37
JUISTENZEITUNG 602 (1982).
330. See MERTENS, supra note 253, § 93, cmt. 174; WIEDEMANN, supra note
261, at 50; Raiser, Gesellschafterklagen, supra note 265, at 3-4; Buxbaum, Gover-
nance of Subsidiaries, supra note 250, at 511.
[Diecision of the German Supreme Court... itself indirectly but clearly
influenced by American principles ... not only extends German doctrine
beyond its primarily statutory framework [,1 but also breaks new ground
in developing a shareholder's remedy that may be a first step towards a
'common law' derivative suit.
Id. It should be noted, however, that the traditional concept of German corporate
law makes a distinction between a case in which the managers are in breach of
their fiduciary duty and the case in which an "internal irregularity" in shareholder
meeting procedures has occurred. In the first case, as previously mentioned, the
company is the party affected and therefore, it alone is entitled to relief. Where
an illegal act falls within the category of an "internal irregularity," shareholder
rights are infringed, and they are, therefore, eligible to bring an action against the
company. See Grossfeld, supra note 102, at 107. However, taking the decision of
the Bundesgerichtshof into consideration, this doctrinal concept has arguably lost
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in breach of duties it owes to the corporation. Moreover, as has
been emphasized, closer examination of the legislators' intent,
as well as of the legislative history, fails to prove conclusively
that the Stock Corporation Act was designed to establish a
comprehensive and exclusive plan for dealing with the problem
of corporate agents' misbehavior.
The extension of individual shareholder suits as it is pur-
sued by some legal scholars, seems more desirable than a com-
plete adoption of the existing U.S. derivative suit regime. First,
it would not require a substantial change in the foundation of
the German corporate governance system, but rather it would
add an additional device to the given law. Secondly, since the
Aufsichtsrat has proven to be an effective control mechanism
for preventing the majority of egregious derelictions by corpo-
rate managers, a general push toward the American structure
of shareholder suits might well turn out to be beyond necessi-
ty. Existing evidence still refutes brash assumptions such as,
for example, corporate managers and members of the supervi-
sory board systematically act contrary to investors' best inter-
est.3 ' Reformers should keep in mind that the German two-
tier regime of oversight diminishes the plausibility of the
investors' demand for legal protection. Effective "contractual"
ex ante monitoring of breaches of trust in the majority of cases
alleviates the demand for monitoring ex-post through the legal
system. And, after all, whereas legal proceedings as a practical
certainty occur after managerial misbehavior has already lead
to damages, monitoring the agents internally gives at least a
chance for timely intervention and an internal solution."3 2 In
other words, whereas the control exercised by the Aufsichtsrat
can be preventive, a shareholder suit to recover damages is, by
definition, only a post-transaction remedy."
part of its strict authority.
331. But see Roth, supra note 92, at 1382. Roth is of the opinion that the
Aufsichtsrat is in fact "unable to counterbalance the dominance of management
within the corporation." He concludes that supervision "in the proper sense of the
word" requires that the supervisory body be separated not only from the manage-
ment, "but also from the enterprise itself." He suggests, inter alia, the establish-
ment of a self-policing, industry-wide association.
332. See Vagts, The European System, supra note 281, at 168 (stating that "if
things start to slip, [the Aufsichtsrat is] expected to start to take action").
333. See von Samson-Himmelstjerna, supra note 245, at 304. For the purpose
of supervising, for example, the Aufsichtsrat may, at any time, request from the
management group written report about corporate matters. Moreover, the supervis-
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A push toward the American derivative suit would encoun-
ter yet another difficulty: Under the German Stock Corporation
Act (unlike in the United States), no explicit business judg-
ment rule exists to balance groundless shareholder activism,
and to shelter directors from liability for decisions that prove
only in hindsight to have been wrong." 4 German courts, of
course, recognize that management needs wide discretion in
running the company, and that the factfinder has to take into
consideration all special circumstances and relevant facts of
the particular situation before liability can be assumed. How-
ever, the sparsity of actual decisions has made an elaborate
case-by-case determination of typical business judgment situa-
tions impossible. In Germany, there is, unlike in the United
States, so far no array of case law to provide definitive "sign-
posts" of liability. Besides, it is far from certain if the judges
under the German civil-law system (where both procedural and
substantial conditions, as a general rule, must be laid down in
provisions of a code or statute), would show the flexibility with
which important substantive features of the derivative action
such as the business judgment rule and the "demand" or "de-
mand excused" rule have been molded by the American
courts."'5
Unless German courts have exactly determined the mar-
gins of deference toward managerial discretion on a case-by-
case basis, minority-shareholders might be inclined to forget
ing group has the right to inspect all corporate books, records and inventories
according to AktG § 111.
334. See Buxbaum, Business Judgment Rule, supra note 203, at 79-102 (includ-
ing information about the historical background of American law); Fischel &
Bradley, supra note 226, at 283-84. See also WIEDEMANN, supra note 261, at 55;
Raiser, Aufsichtsratsmitglieder, supra note 269, at 552 (describing the German
statutory regulations as "colorless general-clauses"); Steefel & von Falkenhausen,
supra note 62, at 532; Eckert, supra note 53, at 41. See also Raiser, Einflu3 der
Kreditinstitute, supra note 95, at 2261; MERTENS, supra note 253, at 156 (propos-
ing the adoption of the business judgement rule). The scope of the business judg-
ment rule is occasionally criticized in the U.S. as being too broad. See Glenn E.
Hess, Corporate Governance-zum Stand der Diskussion in den Vereinigten Staaten,
in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: OPTBMERUNG DER UNTERNEHMENSFUEHRUNG UND DER
UNTERNEHMENSKONTROLLE IM DEUTSCHEN UND AMERIKANISCHEN AKTIENRECHT 9,
17-18 (Dieter Feddersen et al. eds., 1996).
335. See Coffee, Organhaftung, supra note 312, at 205; Grossfeld, supra note
102, at 107; Berger, supra note 317, at 689. The absence of German jurisprudence
on such features is due to the fact that suits against directors have yet not been
widely used.
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about their limited stake in the company,33 and use their
eased access to courts to question typical managerial business-
decisions, each time forcing the management to meet the bur-
den of proving the correctness of their behavior. Moreover,
there is fear that if minority shareholders might sue whenever
performance that seems optimal ex ante turns out poorly ex
post, managers may tend to avoid risky projects." As it is
known to the American reader, U.S. scholars have shown that
risk-adversity would run counter to the interests of sharehold-
ers because of their ability to diversify their portfolio.3 9 The
assumption that German managers might become more risk-
averse gains support from the fact that German corporate law
does not yet have an elaborate system of indemnification and
insurance for management in situations where they might
have committed egregious errors of judgement, but have not
gained personally.34 °
In light of all this, it is predictable that German
policymakers will respect their nation's path dependance 4'
and decide to modestly expand upon the rules the legislator
has recently developed.34 The doctrinal framework governing
the corporate structure and the relationship between the legal
entity and its owners appears to be too deep-rooted to be sub-
ject to a fundamental push toward a system whose benefits,
336. See Coffee, Organhaftung, supra note 312, at 206; Eckert, supra note 53,
at 42 (suggesting that in the U.S. the business judgement rule has evolved pri-
marily as a tool of "self defense" against "nuisance" shareholder litigation).
337. See Schlechtriem, supra note 251, at 78; MERTENS, supra note 253, at 159;
Swanson, Corporate Governance, supra note 1, at 449 (stating that "shareholders
for the most part simply desire the advantages of holding an investment that
provides a beneficial return").
338. See Raiser, Gesellschafterklagen, supra note 269, at 7. See also 2 AMERI-
CAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 211, at 6; Fischel & Bradley, supra note 226, at
266 (stating that shareholders prefer risky projects because of their ability to di-
versify); FANTo, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AMERICAN AND FRENCH LAW, supra
note 27, at 103 (summarizing the argument).
339. See Buxbaum, Business Judgment Rule, supra note 203, at 81.
340. See Schneider, Haftungsmilderung, supra note 251, at 797-98. See Hopt,
Directors' Duties, supra note 237, at 131; Schlechtriem, supra note 251, at 77. For
the corporate governance impact of such protection, see FANTO, CORPORATE GOVER-
NANCE IN AMERICAN AND FRENCH LAW, supra note 27, at 118.
341. See generally Roe, supra note 37, at 641. See von Samson-Himmelstjerna,
supra note 245, at 305; Kfibler, German Dilemma, supra note 130, at 111-12 (stat-
ing Germans' "widespread inclination to mistake formal organizations for living
autonomous entities").
342. See Coffee, Organhaftung, supra note 312, at 199.
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even when seen from the U.S. perspective, 3 do not clearly
outweigh its possible disadvantages."
On the other hand, we have seen that, despite controversy
about the economic outcome of such suits, a strong argument
can be made that a real prospect of being held accountable for
breaches of the duty of loyalty is helpful to more effectively
deter managers from future wrongful conduct, such as cheat-
ing."5 All guessing about the "real benefit" of such suits and
the effects of strike litigation loses much of its weight when
managers have engaged in self-dealing transactions, or have
extracted corporation's secrets for their own benefit.346 Some
observers have also expressed hope that more frequent action
might help to provide greater certainty about the duties of
German directors under the particular circumstances.347 They
argue that more suits will lead to more concrete rules because
courts have more chances to define the scope of the law.
Thus, an approach that attempts to strike a balance be-
tween the dangers of improperly preventing proceedings
343. See 2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 211, at 6; KLEIN & COFFEE,
supra note 29, at 153; FANTO, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AMERICAN AND FRENCH
LAW, supra note 27, at 114; Romano, supra note 204, at 84 (finding little empiri-
cal evidence of specific disciplining influence, thus concluding that "shareholder
litigation is a weak, if not ineffective, instrument of corporate governance"); CARY
& EISENBERG, supra note 21, at 1126-29 (criticizing Professor Romano's approach).
For a more optimistic view of the role of derivative suits, see Donald E. Schwartz,
In Praise of Derivative Suits: A Commentary on the Paper of Professors Fischel
and Bradley, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 322, 328 (1986).
344. See Raiser, Aufsichtsratsmitglieder, supra note 269, at 553. Generally
speaking, a U.S. reader may get the impression that important features of Ger-
man corporate lawv are still left to more or less operate mechanically and are,
therefore, somewhat inflexible regulations. The relationship between management
and shareholders appears only to some extent penetrated by the fiduciary duty
concept.
345. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 29, at 199-200; FANTO, CORPORATE GOV-
ERNANCE IN AMERICAN AND FRENCH LAW, supra note 27, at 104 n.3; Hess, supra
note 334, at 24; Fischel & Bradley, supra note 226, at 287 (stating a limited,
albeit important justification for the derivative suit). See also MERTENS, supra note
253, at 163 (suggesting the German perspective).
346. See Kenneth E. Scott, The Role of Preconceptions in Policy Analysis in
Law: A Response to Fischel and Bradley, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 299, 301-02 (1986).
A recent example in Germany is the "Steinkuehler-case"' in which a prominent
union manager used inside information obtained in his position as a member of
the supervisory board in a big corporation to engage in stock trading. See
Feddersen et al., supra note 11, at 5-6.
347. See 2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 211, at 12 (addressing the
"educational and socializing" function of shareholder suits).
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against managers, and the dangers of obstruction by a small
group of dissenting shareholders seems most likely to be pur-
sued. In any event, attempts to remodel shareholder protection
do not remain silent on the important issue of who bears the
litigation costs. Even after the recent amendment, the rules
governing litigation expenses will be subject of the debate.348
This is predictable, since AktG section 147, paragraph 4, as
amended, achieves only a minor change: Under the old provi-
sion the minority that had requested that a claim for damages
be asserted was obligated to reimburse the costs of litigation to
the (unsuccessful) company; it now only must reimburse costs
that exceed the benefits received because of the action. Since,
after all, recovery may at best accrue to the corporation, and
not to the shareholders compelling the corporation to sue, it
already has been proposed that the Stock Corporation Act
should rely on the general rule of ZPO section 91 (Civil Proce-
dure Code, Zivilprozessordnung), and let the corporation as the
plaintiff take the cost risk. Consequently, the conflicting statu-
tory provision U1 would have to be repealed. Policymakers say
that over-enforcement in the form of strike suits and detrimen-
tal settlements between a plaintiff and the directors would still
be less likely to arise under German law. They argue that
where the corporation sues, no personal shareholder interest
can directly affect the course of the litigation. This is said to be
true even in "minority" suits because any plaintiff-shareholder
is only a representative of the corporation.5 0 Additional pro-
posals have been made suggesting that, if the court on examin-
ing the substance of the allegations should come to the conclu-
sion that the suit has been poorly grounded, it should be in its
discretion to order the shareholders involved personally to pay
all or part of the court costs and legal fees so far incurred.351
348. See Grossfeld & Ebke, Controlling the Modern Corporation, supra note 93,
at 98; Raiser, Einflufl der Kreditinstitute, supra note 95, at 2261.
349. See KonTraG, amending AktG § 147(4).
350. See Eckert, supra note 53, at 77.
351. See Amended Fifth, supra note 170. For a different approach see KLAUS
BRONDICS, DM AKTIONARSKLAGE 175-76 (1988) (suggesting no change to the rules
governing the costs of a lawsuit, but allowing shareholders insurance covering such
litigation expenses).
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CONCLUSION
Shareholder participation in corporate decisionmaking
plays an important role in corporate governance of large-pub-
licly-held corporations both in Germany and in the United
States. One can think of amendments that strengthen this
value in German corporate law. However, any reform should
consider a cost-benefit analysis and avoid "overregulation" that
leads only to negligible improvement to the present practice.
A seemingly desirable more pluralistic proxy system with
active outside monitors and proxy holders, such as banks,
institutional investors and shareholder protection groups, will
not set aside or even solve the major principal-agent problems.
Banks and non-bank institutional investors are likely to
continue to be the 'big players' in the exercise of voting rights.
The increasing number of intermediaries in the corporation-
shareholder relation is not a problem related to banks only.
Rather, the institutional investors will cause similar problems.
Since we may not succeed to activate the rationally apathetic
small principals, the main focus should be on the elaboration
of the proxy holder's duties.
As to the enforcement of German management's fiduciary
obligations, American readers may have realized that even an
improvement in the current corporate law structure in Germa-
ny is unlikely to bring shareholder litigation against manageri-
al misfeasance to the forefront of German corporate gover-
nance. Remaining differences between each law's system of
meeting litigants' expenses still assure that shareholders suits,
even if in fact aided by the recently discussed devices, will not
become as frequent an occurrence as in the United States.352
Yet, discussion about the scope of managerial accountability is
ongoing and, hence, further steps in the direction of a more
active shareholder protection may be taken. It remains to be
seen to what extent such ideas may be harmonized with the
overall concept of the German Aktiengesetz.
352. American scholars have repeatedly described attorney's fees as the force
that drives derivative actions. They have even stated that, without the prospect of
recouping attorneys' fees, many if not most of the cases in the U.S. would never
be brought. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as
Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 26-33 (1985).
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